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China’s rise to power has become central in Asia-Pacific regional affairs and has 
irrevocably impacted worldwide politics. Although up to this point, China’s rise to power 
has largely been peaceful, this could change in the future as regional and global partners 
continue to react to China’s increasing power. This thesis explores China’s rise to power 
at three different levels: domestic, regional and global. In doing so, it analyzes various 
impacts to and of China’s rise and the ramifications it could have for the region and the 
world. Through an examination of various components of international relations theory, 
each chapter assesses the impacts of this rise and explores China’s vulnerabilities. Within 
China, fragile human security issues exist that could ultimately destabilize the regime and 
its power. Regionally and internationally, China has allowed its rise to power to take on a 
negative connotation.  This is largely a result of China’s aggressive behavior directed 
towards its neighbors. China must establish its role as a rising power in the larger global 
arena and how it intends to impact the world. This thesis ascertains that China’s rise to 
power has come to negatively affect relations in the region and the world.  It also makes 
clear the need for China to modify its approach. China’s rise to power will have a lasting 
effect on global affairs and change international relations as we know it. 
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China—with the world’s largest population, fastest growing economy and a 
defense budget second only to the United States—is a rising power. China’s rise to power 
will continue to be one of the defining events of the 21
st
 century. It is shaping global 
affairs and is at the forefront of many states’ political and defense agendas. In just a few 
decades, China went from a country of isolation, with little global interaction, to a 
country of economic and political interests around the world, from Latin America, to 
Africa, and to China’s own backyard. In the future, China is predicted to become the 
world’s largest economy, to continue to build a worldwide naval force and to be an 
influential player in world politics. The impact of China’s rise is felt on every continent 
and has begun to make some western observers nervous. 
Not only is China’s rise affecting global affairs, but it is deeply impacting 
regional relations within Southeast Asia. The balance of power in the Southeast Asian 
region has already shifted. Many states are anxious over China’s rising power status and 
how China will use this power, especially with its advancing military capabilities. 
Ongoing disputes, such as the South China Sea conflict, have brought China’s expanding 
military power to the forefront as China continues to pursue an aggressive agenda over 
this territory. As a result, many of China’s neighbors have begun to diversify their 
relationships and become less reliant on this unpredictable country. 
This thesis explores China’s rise to power and its effects at three different levels: 
domestic, regional, and global. On the domestic level, this thesis examines vulnerabilities 





politicians, and academics portray China’s rise as a strong and direct threat to western 
interests and ideals. Although this rise is a threat, this thesis argues that there are several 
domestic human security issues that could ultimately affect China’s rise and explores 
how this might occur. Together, the chapters show that although China has secured 
increased political influence, economic might, and military capabilities, its increasing 
power has begun to negatively impact regional and international relations—ultimately 
creating challenges for its rise. China is using its new status to further pursue its national 
interests, which has caused neighbors and others to question Chinese intensions. China’s 
assertion in regional and global affairs has also increased due to its expanding power. 
This thesis seeks to explore and better understand some of these complexities. 
 The first chapter asks how China’s internal stability and domestic affairs impacts 
its global rise to power. Behind China’s rising power status, is a fragile set of human 
security issues that could greatly impact China’s progress as an up and coming power. 
Chinese power is built on a fragile domestic system at great risk for instability. Issues 
such as unemployment, pollution, and human rights violations are mounting problems for 
the rising power. These domestic issues are ultimately intertwined and cause an equal 
threat to stability. Not only does this chapter explore these potential trigger points, but it 
investigates how civil unrest could occur in China, ultimately derailing China’s rise.  This 
chapter looks at three of the United Nations seven human security elements including, 
economic security, environmental security, and personal security and examines what, if 
any threat they pose to Chinese domestic stability. These three elements of human 





Chinese unrest. Through this study an assessment of how civil conflict might transpire 
within China becomes clearer. 
The first chapter concludes by arguing that a large number of severe domestic 
problems which exist in China, allows for a high probability of unrest in China’s future. 
No one human security issue is of a greater threat to China than another, due to the 
interconnection between these issues. Environmental, economic and personal security 
problems all have an effect on each other.  Early signs of unrest such as protests and 
citizen discontent do exist within China; however, the conditions for such a massive 
uprising are not yet volatile. In time this will likely change and unrest could occur with 
little warning, since many of the conditions are already present in Chinese society. If 
economic growth in China continues to slow and more people face economic hardships, 
combined with the economic and personal security issues, unrest and instability could 
ensue.  
The focus of the second chapter is to address how China’s rise to power is 
affecting its interstate relations in Southeast Asia. Relations between China and its 
Southeast Asian neighbors are becoming increasingly important as China’s power 
continues to expand. China’s rising strength has made neighboring states anxious 
concerning future relations in the region. Through the context of state alignment 
strategies, three specific relationships will be explored—China’s relations with Vietnam, 
Burma, and the Philippines—to investigate the impact of China’s rise to power on 
regional economic, military, and political relations and how these countries are in turn 
responding. These three cases have a wide range of historic relations and alignment 





relationship changes. By looking through the scope of state alignment strategies this 
thesis will be able to explore the direct affect China’s increasing power has had on 
regional relationships. 
The second chapter determines that relationships between China and its Southeast 
Asian neighbors have already been negatively impacted due to China’s expanding power. 
China’s neighbors are growing increasingly concerned over the growth of Chinese power 
and aggression, especially its military force. This stems from both a historic past of 
Chinese aggression and the recent upsurge in hostility now backed by a powerful military. 
This argument is supported by the three case studies, which conclude that all three 
countries are diversifying their relations to become less reliant on China. In fact, all three 
countries were found to be improving relations with the United States and amongst each 
other in order to become less dependent on China. The Vietnam and Burma case studies 
even suggest that both countries have begun to change their historic alignment strategies 
due to China’s increasing power. 
The third and final chapter asks how has China’s level of assertion over its 
territorial rights in the South China Sea affected its relations with the United States. 
Three periods of high level of Chinese assertion were examined to determine how the 
United States has previously and is currently reacting to Chinese aggression and if 
relations between the two countries has changed as a result of Chinese actions over this 
territorial dispute. Naval battles involving China in 1974, 1988, and the increase in 
tensions between 2010 and today over the South China Sea were explored to judge US 





China’s level of assertion in the South China Sea has not altered considerably 
over the past several decades. What has changed is China’s level of power, which has 
made both China’s neighbors and the United States anxious over China’s future 
intensions, especially in regards to its expanding military capabilities, and how China 
could use them in the future. The United States has changed its policy over the South 
China Sea dispute in response to an increase in China’s rise and not as a result of Chinese 
assertion. China is an up and coming powerhouse that could ultimately challenge US 
hegemony and change the balance of power at the international level. The United States 
has become increasingly wary of China’s increased power. The future of US-Chinese 






























CHAPTER 1: DOMESTICALLY: HOW CHINA’S INTERNAL STABILITY AND 





China, with the world’s largest population, one of the fastest growing economies, 
and a defense budget second only to the United States, is a rising power. Behind this 
rising giant, however, is a fragile set of human security issues that could greatly impact 
China’s progress. China is internally weaker than it appears. Issues such as 
unemployment, pollution, and human rights violations are mounting problems. These 
human security issues could ultimately derail China’s rise by creating domestic instability. 
How China reacts to and handles human security problems could determine how and if 
China’s rise continues. Not only could these domestic problems impact China’s future 
but they could also significantly affect foreign investment and diplomatic relations. This 
chapter asks, how does China’s internal stability and domestic affairs impacted its larger 
global rise to power. These internal stability issues include economic problems, 
environmental degradation, and human rights violations. These problems will be 
investigated through the context of human security and other literature focused on how 
civil conflict begins. With such a large population and a still developing country, these 
domestic problems could result in violence or even potentially the downfall of the current 
regime. The recent Arab Spring is a reminder of how internal issues can ultimately topple 
regimes and instill change. The more instability China experiences, the greater the 
probability that its rise to power could be short-term.  These domestic problems are 







In the late 1970s, China began reforming its economy by opening its communist 
based markets.  Since this transformation, China has become a rising power with its 
economy, military strength, and political influence increasing rapidly. China’s position, 
however, is fragile. China’s rise has made regional politics more volatile and put the 
international community on edge, including the United States, which, in 2010, announced 
a military pivot towards Asia. Although China appears to be an emerging international 
powerhouse, domestically China is actually weaker than it appears. Internal domestic 
issues and human security problems inside China are a large reason why its rising status 
is fragile.  
This literature review explores China’s rise to power, its importance, and how 
internal unrest could ultimately undermine this rise and set China back. First, this section 
will analyze the connection between international affairs and domestic policies, looking 
at how the two intertwine and affect each other. Both the external and internal factors that 
tie foreign and domestic policy are examined to understand how China’s rise could be 
affected due to domestic instability. This literature review also explores the new theory of 
human security and its role in international relations, specifically human security’s 
emerging importance in understanding why domestic unrest occurs. Next, this section 
will look into the causes of civil conflict to establish a baseline as to why civil unrest 
occurs and what it could mean for China.  Lastly, it will investigate the idea of creeping 
democratization and if this is possibly occurring in China, adding to existing domestic 
problems. Examining these theories and policies will help determine how China’s 






Importance of a Rising Power 
In order to fully understand the importance of a state’s increasing power and the 
need for stability from the domestic population, we must first understand what a rising 
power is and its importance in international affairs. According to Hart and Jones, there is 
no commonly accepted definition of a rising power, nor is there an internationally 
recognized set of traits.
1
 In fact, all rising powers exist under different circumstances, 
which can make determining a specific definition difficult. While a specific definition 
does not exist, Hart and Jones do present several commonalities that rising powers 
usually exhibit. These include: emerging economic might, aspiring influential role in 
international affairs, internal cohesion, and expanding military and political resources.
2
  
Further, a rising power must also be able to interact with other strong states on the 
international level. China displays a number of these characteristics and can be 
categorized as a rising power because of its economic strength, expanding military, and 
increasing role on the international level. 
According to realists, a nation’s interests are shaped by the amount of power it 
holds and therefore it is within every state’s interest to attempt to expand its amount of 
power, so it can seek greater national interests, thus leading to more international 
influence.
3
  The transformation to a rising power is a slow process and can take decades 
for a state to achieve. With additional power, states continue to seek more political and 
economic influence and may even expand its military.  In China’s case, this rise to power 
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 Andrew Hart and Bruce Jones, “How Do Rising Powers Rise?” Survival 52, No. 6, (2010): 65. 
2
 Ibid, 65. 
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began with the reform of its markets in 1978, which accelerated the growth of the 
Chinese economy and eventually led to increased economic, military, and political 
influence.
4
  The more power a state has the more influence it can exert in the global arena 
and over weaker states. Not only can rising powers upset the balance of power in a region, 
they can use their new influence to apply political, economic, or military pressure to 
smaller weaker states. This is why a rising power, especially if it is a close neighbor, can 
be such a dangerous threat to smaller, often weaker states. Some states in Southeast Asia 
have begun to feel threatened by China’s strength and have begun exploring options to 
expand their economic, military, and diplomatic ties in order to be less dependent on 
China. 
 
Connection between Foreign and Domestic Policies 
 As the world becomes more globalized, it is increasingly clear that everything is 
interconnected. In fact, both internal and external factors in international relations can 
have an effect on a state’s foreign policy. In China’s case, its foreign policy is used to 
continue its rise to power. As Beasley and Snarr note, “Foreign policy is typically the 
result of many domestic and international factors….Both types (internal and external 
factors), work directly and independently to influence a state’s foreign policy.”
5
 There is 
a clear connection between domestic policies, internal state issues, and a state’s foreign 
policy decisions. The relationship between internal and external factors is crucial in how 
a state might respond to internal instability and how that might affect its larger global 
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stance or outlook. It is important to understand this relationship since this chapter is 
looking into China’s internal factors and their influence on China’s foreign policy. 
 External factors, or those from outside a state, can impact the domestic and 
political landscape of a country. External factors include other actors or an issue. These 
external actors could include other states, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, and foreign firms. According to Beasley and Snarr, they could also include 
issues such as democratization pressures, world opinion on human rights, and 
globalization.
6
 In China’s case, often faced are external pressures over human rights and 
democratization issues. For example, when China was applying for membership to the 
World Trade Organization it faced strong scrutiny regarding its human rights violations, 
and questions about the intentions of the regime. In this case, China faced external 
pressures over internal issues which factored into its foreign policy.
7
   
 Internal factors also play a major role when determining a state’s foreign policy. 
Internal factors are those from within a state. Things such as a state’s economic situation, 
the regime in power, and citizens’ opinions all affect state foreign policy decisions.  A 
state may choose to adjust its foreign policy due to the internal environment. For example, 
if a state is dealing with domestic unrest it may relocate resources from its foreign policy 
and use them to address the domestic issues.  For this chapter, internal factors are closely 
examined to determine the effect they have or could have as China continues to rise. As 
China opened up its markets and postured itself to become an up-and-coming power, it 
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continues to closely monitor domestic affairs to prevent the collapse of the regime.
8
 
China’s greatest fear is to lose power. Because China is so focused on domestic unrest, it 
could return to its past of isolationism. Isolationism is the policy of abstaining from 
political or economic relations with other countries.
9
 This policy limits foreign 
involvement and therefore the possible consequences of foreign relations, including 
conflict. Isolationism also allows the country to focus on its domestic situation without 
the involvement of external factors as discussed above.  China was an isolationist state 
throughout its history, most recently under Mao Zedong in 1949; however, the reforms of 
1978 lifted this policy of seclusion.  
 Although China is extremely focused on domestic stability, economic growth, and 
regime strength, it is highly unlikely that China will return to a policy of isolationism. 
China will continue to denounce attempts by other countries that interfere in its domestic 
affairs. Additionally, China cannot economically afford to return to a policy of 
isolationism. In this era of globalization, China’s economy is rooted in international 
markets and it has expanded its alliance network worldwide from Africa to South 
America.  Many of the internal factors that China is focused on are labeled in 
international relations as human security issues. These internal problems are actually a 
threat to China’s national security and rise to power.  
 
Human Security 
Human Security is a relatively new concept in the international relations field that 
has only emerged in the last two decades. Traditionally, security has been thought of in 
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terms of protection of the nation-state involving conventional militaries, strategies, and 
tactics. According to Steven Walt, the traditional definition of security in international 
relations is the “threat, use and control of military forces” by nation-states.
10
 Following 
the end of the Cold War, academics and policymakers began to notice that traditional 
security of a nation-state did not necessarily guarantee security of citizens. People 
continued to die in internal state conflicts regardless of the relative peace between nation-
states. Violence and instability still existed without problems at the international and 
regional levels. Academics, as well as policymakers including Robert McNamara, also 
pointed to environmental degradation and natural disasters as threats to human security 
that they believed should demand as much attention as conventional military conflicts.
11
 
Many academics began to believe that a state’s stability was dependent upon the 
domestic population and these factors. As Axworthy explains, “Peace and security—
national, regional and international—are all possible only if they are derived from 
peoples’ security.”
12
 Citizens and domestic affairs are often key to peace and prosperity. 
The term human security was used to fill this void in security studies. 
 
What is Human Security? 
The term human security was first used in the 1994 United Nations Human 
Development Report.  The report stated that: 
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of 
territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign 
                                                          
10
 Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1 
(March 1991): 212. 
11
 Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reelections in Office, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968); 
and Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security, Vol. 8 No.3, (1983): 131. 
12
 Lloyd Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First.” Global Governance 





policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust....Forgotten were 





The report goes on to identify seven elements of human security, which include economic 
security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, 
community security, and political security.  
Human security goes beyond the traditional security model and looks at 
individuals within a society and how internal problems within a state could impact the 
larger international community. This concept focuses on the individual rather than the 
international or state as the important actor. As Axworthy explains, “Human security 
today puts people first and recognizes that their safety is integral to the promotion and 
maintenance of international peace and security.”
14
 Other definitions of human security 
also exist. For example, Jorge Nef adds cultural security, or traditional values, and 
collective experiences of a group of people to the list of elements covered by human 
security.
15
 Reed and Tehranian argue that human security is not just about physical 
security but should include psychological security, or “the freedom from fear, right to 
privacy and tolerance of differences,” and communication security, or “the freedom and 
balance of information flows.”
16
    
Numerous academics and policymakers believe that the term human security is 
defined too broadly and therefore is of little use. Paris, King and Murray all agree that the 
concept of human security actually lacks a real definition and the term is vague, 
                                                          
13
 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 22. 
14
 Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance.” 20. 
15
 Jorge Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability, International Development Research Centre, 
Ottawa, (1999): 16.  
16
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encompassing a large range of issues all of which cannot and should not be covered 
under the human security umbrella.
17
 King and Murray offer a definition of human 
security as one’s “expectation of years of life without experiencing the state of 
generalized poverty.”
18
 Paris, however, argues that King and Murray narrow the 
definition of human security by instead favoring certain values of human security over 
others without proper justification.
19
 He goes on to say that under the King-Murray 
formula there can exist a high level of human security yet one can still be a victim of 
violence due to state policies. Paris suggests instead of defining and creating criteria for 
human security, it should be used as a label to study non-military threats to states and 
individuals, thereby dividing human security topics from traditional security studies.
20
 
Making human security a broad label, however, does little to narrow the scope or help to 
define the term to derive better analysis.  
Although there is plenty of argument over what should or should not be included 
in the definition or as the components of human security, all of the authors and academics 
cited agree that human security is an important theme and has a place in security studies. 
Human security, or lack thereof, can be a source of violence, specifically domestically, 
that can lead to problems both within a state and internationally. As Axworthy notes, 
“This international discourse on human security is beginning to effect change on the 
institutions and practice of global governance. In this interconnected world, our own 
security is increasingly indivisible from that of our neighbors—at home and abroad.”
21
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 Roland Paris, “Human Security, Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?“  International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2, 
(Fall 2001):  2; and Gary King and Christopher JL Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” Political 
Science Quarterly 116, (2002): 586-588. 
18
 King and Murray, 592. 
19
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The elements of human security outlined by the United Nations are essential needs and 
rights that all human beings should be entitled to. As these basic needs are violated, 
unrest can occur; people feel their lives are in danger or they lack what they believe 
should be guaranteed, and this leads to conflict. This chapter uses the United Nation’s 
original definition and components of human security. The case studies below detail the 
human security issues in China and the possible impact on China’s rise to power both 
regionally and internationally. 
 
Causes of Civil Conflict 
 When individuals’ human security is at risk, civil conflict can often result. 
According to Singer and Small, a civil war is defined as a war that occurs between groups 
within a single state’s boundaries.
22
  Most causes of civil conflict can be linked to the 
idea that people become fearful when their economic, food, health, environmental, 
personal, community or political security is in jeopardy. Beyond the human security 
aspect, there are other variables that can lead to the eruption of civil conflict within a 
society. This section focuses on literature relating to the economic and environmental 
variables leading to civil strife.  
 
Variables to Civil Conflict 
Beyond the human security element, there are several economic variables that 
may factor into a state’s likelihood for civil conflict. Collier and Hoeffler identified four 
main variables that are strong determinates to both the probability and the duration of 
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 The first is opportunity cost of a rebellion. Collier and Hoeffler found that 
in countries that have higher per capita incomes, higher levels of education, and an 
increasing economic growth, the lesser the chance that a civil war would break out.
24
  
Collier and Hoeffler believe that this is because in states with incomes and education, the 
cost benefit of a conflict would not be in the citizen’s best interest. Second, Collier and 
Hoeffler look at the availability of finance and argue that primary commodity exports can 
often generate further grievances, corruption and therefore poor governance.
25
 This type 
of commodity export is often natural resources. Ross argues that there is a strong 
correlation between some natural resources, such as oil, and civil conflict due to the 
resources’ necessity and the level of greed associated with it.
26
 Third, the authors believe 
that certain grievances such as inequality, lack of political rights, ethnic polarization, and 
religious fractionalization play into the causes of a rebellion.
27
  Last, Collier and Hoefller 
argue that the larger the population of a state, the greater the risk of internal conflict. The 
larger the population, the larger the number of grievances and disgruntled people there 
are. 
  
The Role of Youth in Civil Conflict 
 Not only is a state’s domestic environment a source of internal conflict, but so are 
the demographics of a state. The youth bulge is an international relations theory which 
argues that a state with a large population of young people, specifically males, has a 
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 Michael Ross, “What do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal of Peace 
Research, 41, (2004): 337. 
27





higher chance of creating or participating in civil conflict.
28
 Young men are historically a 
volatile portion of a population and are often a main faction in causing unrest.
29
 A lot of 
literature has pointed to this being a problem in developing countries throughout Africa 
and the Middle East where unemployment among the youth is widespread.  Although 
China is not necessarily facing a youth bulge due to the rapidly aging society, it does 
have a large male surplus. It is estimated by the year 2020 there will be 35 million young 
males who are unable to marry due to the one child policy and surplus of males born in 
the 1980’s and 90’s.
30
 History has shown that violent youth lead protests can occur in 
China, the most famous example Tiananmen Square. Recently, China’s youth has yet to 
cause a major uprising, probably because China’s economy has been strong and 
continuing to grow. As China faces many domestic issues and its economy begins to slow, 
this large population of males could present a problem to China’s internal stability.   
 
The Role of Chinese Politics 
Politics within China is a key component to not only China’s rise in power, but in 
how they conduct their foreign affairs and handle domestic unrest and human security 
issues. In 1949, Mao Zedong, the leader of China’s Communist Party at the time, 
established China as a communist country; between 1949 and 1978, China was a 
traditional communist system
31
 that was rooted in a Marxist-Leninist structure with a 
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Maoist twist focused on military doctrine and rural development. Beginning in 1978, 
when Deng Xiaoping took power, the Chinese communist model was transformed. The 
transformation put China on its path to becoming a rising power. Deng initiated the 
“Reform and Opening Up” policy, which embraced capitalist market principles while 
staying true to socialist ideals. The Chinese government called this “Socialism with 
Chinese Characters,” or adapting a market system to fit with a socialist political system. 
The Chinese government has continued to state that this policy is the “only and 
successful road China must take in building it into a well-off, democratic, civilized and 
harmonious modern nation.”
32
 China opened up its borders to free trade and international 
commerce. Although this policy led to China’s booming economy, it also has brought 
social issues that the Chinese Communist Party did not foresee. 
Despite China’s move away from the communist economic model, it continues to 
cling to a totalitarian leadership model. Minxin Pei explains this phenomenon as 
“Creeping Democratization.” Minxin argues that China cannot continue as an 
authoritarian state while maintaining an open economy.
33
 He goes on to discuss the subtle 
changes that have begun in China’s political institutions such as the establishment of 
checks and balances and law at the local level.
34
 Democratization complements a market 
economy and Chinese citizens are coming to expect greater rights and freedoms that 
often come with the opportunities in an open economy. The current economic system is 
not compatible with Chinese governance and this has the potential to cause unrest in 
China. As Shirk notes, the more developed and well off China becomes, the more 
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threatened the government becomes because the citizens feel entitled to more.
35
 This 
creeping democratization has the potential to cause mass unrest as Chinese citizens feel 
denied freedoms and human security issues arise.  
China’s reform to an open market economy may be why the regime has continued 
to remain strong and unrest has not yet impacted China. Since China’s economic reforms, 
the Chinese economy has greatly expanded leading to economic benefits for many 
citizens. In fact over 300 million people are part of the new middle class in China, seeing 
economic wealth that was impossible under the socialist market system.
36
 This growth 
has helped to maintain stability throughout China. Civil conflict is often tied to economic 
conditions as discussed earlier. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and unrest 
in several Middle Eastern countries during the Arab Spring were spurred by economic 
downturns. The social conditions in these countries were right for unrest and poor 
economic performance lead to social instability, ultimately bringing down governments. 
In China, the economic growth has begun to slow after decades of colossal development. 
This slowdown could ultimately sets off unrest throughout the country.  
 
Hypothesis 
China is a rising power and potentially the world’s next superpower. However, 
China must address several human security issues among its domestic population 
including economic security, environmental security, and personal security in order to 
continue on its path to power. If China does not address these issues then domestic unrest 
could severely harm or slow China’s overall rise to power including its economic and 
                                                          
35
 Minxin Pei, “Creeping Democratization in China,” 70.  
36






political systems. In the future, depending upon the severity of these issues, the regime’s 
security could potentially be jeopardized. Although another Tiananmen Square is by no 
means looming, China, to maintain the status quo, should consider quickly addressing 
and finding solutions to these human security problems. As China continues to develop, 
its citizens are likely to become more organized and more determined to demand changes 
that will increase prosperity. As China becomes wealthier, citizens will come to expect 
more freedoms and democratic values that are promoted by capitalism. By examining 
China’s internal domestic vulnerabilities, one is able to see how fragile China really is 
and how quickly the rising giant could crumble from the inside. 
 
Methodology 
In examining China’s internal domestic situation and its fragile nature, this 
chapter focuses on three specific domestic policy and human security areas: economic 
security, environmental security, and personal security. These three elements of human 
security were chosen because they are the elements I considered to be of greatest threat to 
Chinese stability. By looking at these top three human security threat we can assess if one, 
all, or a combination of could cause domestic unrest. These three case studies examine 
potential areas of unrest that could undermine Chinese rising power, look at the problems 
that exist in each security area, how the Chinese government is responding, and the 
possible outcome if these issues are not addressed. After examining each of the case 
studies it becomes more apparent how weak China actually is and the magnitude of its 






HUMAN SECURIY ISSUES IN CHINA 
Economic Security 
 China’s economy has been the fastest growing economy in the world during the 
past three decades since the reforms of 1978. For over thirty years, growth has averaged 
about 9 percent and economists estimate that China could become the world’s largest 
economy by 2035.
37
 This economic growth has meant higher living standards and overall 
improvement in several social areas, including education and health care. These high 
numbers, however, only illustrate a portion of China’s economic figures. Other economic 
measurements show the actual extent of economic problems in China including high rates 
of unemployment, inequality, and rapid urbanization. These are all issues that affect 
China’s domestic population and its economic security. For example, although China’s 
overall economy has quickly risen and it has the second largest economy in the world, its 
per capita GDP in 2012 was only $6,188 according to the World Bank, substantially 
different from the top economy in the world, the United States, whose per capita GDP in 
2012 was $49,965.
38
 Although China’s overall economy is growing, underlying domestic 
economic conditions continue to present a problem that could ultimately derail China’s 
rise. This case study focuses on the problems of inequality, unemployment, urbanization, 
and sustaining economic growth in China.   
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Unemployment in China 
Unemployment is a large economic problem that faces China today. Not only 
does unemployment negatively impact the economy but it can also be a large 
destabilizing factor among the population. As of June 2013, China had a reported 
unemployment number of 4.1 percent according to the Ministry of Social Security and 
Human Resources.
39
 This official number has been largely unchanged for the last decade. 
Actual unemployment numbers were estimated to be near 8 percent in 2011, double the 
official number, according to a Chinese-run academic survey.
40
 The difference in 
numbers is in part because the Chinese government only reports the urban workers and 
those who are eligible for unemployment benefits, excluding the migrant and rural 
populations which make up large portions of the unemployed.
41
 Many Chinese 
economists believe that the true unemployment numbers are actually much higher, 
reaching double digits in some regions of China.
42
 Overall, the unemployment problem is 
more severe than Chinese officials let on.  
 The majority of Chinese unemployment stems from three main groups: migrant 
workers, former employees of state-owned factories, and students. China has a large 
population of migrant workers. In 1949, only 11 percent of the Chinese population lived 
in the mere 69 official cities in China.
43
 Today that number is more than 52.6 percent.
44
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Migrants continue to come to urban centers in order to seek employment.  The economy, 
however, cannot keep up with the growing number of people seeking jobs; hence 
unemployment.
45
 The influx of additional people also makes it difficult for those who 
already reside in urban areas to find jobs. China does not count migrant workers in 
official unemployment numbers, but it is estimated there are approximately 120 million 
unemployed migrant workers.
46
 High unemployment among migrant workers has the 
potential to be dangerous to state stability. Migrants without work often return to rural 
homelands. With little to do and such large numbers of people out of work, this could be 
cause for the people to organize against the government. Over the past two decades, cases 
of rural unrest have dramatically increased both in frequency and size.
47
 The Chinese 
government has always been fearful of rural unrest because they themselves know what 
could come from such a movement. Mao, for example, organized his own revolution 
using peasants from the rural countryside. Rural stability is one reason why maintaining a 
low unemployment rate throughout China is so important.  
China is also facing a high rate of student unemployment. In 2009, an estimated 
32 percent of recent college graduates were unable to secure work right out of school.
48
  
The Chinese job market is unable to supply jobs at the levels needed, in part due to the 
rapid increase in the number of graduates.
49
 Unemployment at these levels among young 
people can be highly destabilizing in a society. As noted in the literature review, young 
men between the ages of 15 and 29 have a higher likelihood of participating in domestic 
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unrest, especially when they have nothing to do. Additionally, as Shirk points out, “These 
are the individuals who would be capable of organizing and leading an opposition 
movement.”
50
 China has already witnessed violence that stemmed from student-led 
demonstrations. Many of those who participated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests 
were students who were calling for democratic reforms.
51
 Although the Tiananmen 
Square protests were not over unemployment, student unemployment and poor economic 
conditions can be dangerous for a state due to discontent and poor living conditions. Fear 
of violence due to unemployment is the main reason why the Chinese government is so 
determined to continue to keep their growth rate steady at 7.5 percent.
52
  The problem of 
unemployment in China will continue to increase as every year more students graduate 
from University unable to find work. In 2013, according to the Chinese Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security,  6.99 million students are set to graduate, an 
increase of 190,000 over 2012.
53
 Every year there is a continued increase in unemployed 
students. China knows what the consequences could be if economic conditions continue 
to fall and citizens are unable to find work.  
 
Inequality in China 
The 1978 economic reforms in China and subsequent development have increased 
economic levels throughout the country, bringing prosperity and wealth to greater 
portions of China. This has also created a problem throughout China; the gap between the 
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rich and poor continues to grow, creating inequality. According to a study by a Chinese 
University, China’s inequality in 2010 was one of the highest in the world.
54
  As one 
economist has warned, “…the growing income gap, and the rise of a new class of 
wealthy officials and entrepreneurs, has stirred resentment among the poor which could 
lead to ‘all types of social instability.’”
55
 Although income inequality occurs in many 
countries, it is significant in China because the level of inequality is rather high, and 
coupled with other grievances, could become a trigger for unrest. Before the economic 
reforms in China, inequality was extremely low because of the communist economic 
structure and state-controlled wages.
56
 In fact, the large levels of inequality go back to 
Minxin’s theory of “creeping democratization.” With a market economy, people not only 
want more prosperity but also feel entitled to it.  
Income inequality is hardly just a problem between the urban and rural areas. In 
fact, some academics believe that Chinese inequality could be regional and the result of 
the peoples’ inability to relocate under Hukou, China’s registration system.
57
 This system 
not only prevents rural workers from receiving many state benefits such as health care but 
also restricts individuals’ ability to migrate from rural to urban areas. Certain Chinese 
states also have a better geographic location and are therefore more economically 
prosperous. For example, those that live in close proximity to ports, neighboring 
economic partners and in areas that receive more government-sponsored development 
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tend to have higher standards of living versus those states that are landlocked and see 
little economic development. Although developing countries often have high levels of 
inequality, China’s levels are so high that economic development has not been able to 
bridge the inequality gap.
58
  
In early 2013, in order to address the inequality gap, Prime Minister Li Keqiang 
announced a plan to continue China’s urbanization. According to news reports, Prime 
Minister Li wanted to cut the rural population by roughly half (approximately 642 million 
people) by forcing resettlement to urban areas.
59
 This policy is aimed at increasing the 
workforce, closing the income gap, and helping create an economy based on 
consumption.
60
 The main critique of this policy, however, is that China already faces high 
levels of urbanization, which in itself is a potential economic security risk. According to 
some estimates, over the last decade China’s urban population has expanded by more 
than 200 million people.
61
 This growth has put stress on the housing market, urban 
infrastructure, and employment in cities.
62
  As migration to the city continues, levels of 
unemployment in urban areas will continue to increase. Although urbanization has 
economic benefits, the movement of people to urban centers needs to be controlled. If 
high levels of urbanization occur in a short period, it can be more detrimental to a city 
than beneficial.   
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Sustaining Economic Growth 
 The Chinese government’s main domestic policies have been and continue to be 
aimed at sustaining economic growth, not only for its continued rise to power but as a 
way to keep the domestic population stable. As mentioned previously, the Chinese 
leadership fears a revolt from its populace and believes maintaining a high rate of 
economic growth will keep the domestic environment stable. For three decades China has 
maintained a growth rate averaging 10 percent.
63
 As Shirk points out, these high levels of 
growth are very rare in economic history and difficult to maintain.
64
 Although China’s 
economic growth has already survived the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and the 
Asian financial crisis in 1998, a future economic crisis or period of domestic unrest could 
crumble China’s economy, causing greater unemployment and instability. China’s 
economy is fragile and a market downturn or political turmoil could unravel the entire 
system. 
China has, and continues to remain, focused on overall economic growth. The 
government understands that economic growth is strongly tied to stability. In fact, all of 
the government’s twelve five-year plans have included economic growth as a main 
priority of the Chinese state. Since 2001, the Communist Party has established an 
economic growth goal of at least 7.5 percent.
65
 This goal is aimed at what economists’ 
project China needs to attain in order to sustain healthy levels of employment.
66
 With 
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such a large population, China needs dramatic levels of growth every year in order to 
reach the projection. 
 Susan Shirk believes that China’s economy can continue to grow at its current 
rate for at least two more decades as long as a political or economic crisis does not 
occur.
67
 Although the Chinese government appears strong and resilient, that is in part 
because the Chinese economy has continued to grow. Economists, however, believe that 
starting in 2009; China’s overall economy began to slow, still growing but just at much 
lower levels.
68
 There are differing opinions as to what this economic slowdown means for 
China. Some argue that this slowdown is natural since it is unrealistic for an economy to 
maintain a high rate of growth for decades.
69
 Others believe that perhaps China’s 
economy is starting to shift towards a consumer-driven economy versus an export-based 
economy.
70
 Whatever the reason for the slowdown, China needs to remain watchful. As 
the economy continues to slow, the regime will now face a larger threat to its stability 
and overall hold on power.  
 
Environmental Security 
 China’s severe environmental issues are greatly impacting the land as well as 
China’s population.  Severe smog smothers China’s cities, acid rain falls from the sky, 
forests are disappearing, and fresh water continues to become scarcer. The large 
migrations of people, rapid industrialization and lack of government control have 
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exacerbated the problem. The Chinese government has recognized that environmental 
issues exist but has failed to provide an adequate response to address these problems. 
Interestingly enough, many of these environmental problems are in part a result of the 
economic boom in China and of pressure from the Chinese government to produce 
economic results without concern for the effects.
71
 The lack of response from the 
government has begun to stir protests and activism in China. Chinese citizens are 
becoming more conscious of health problems that can stem from these issues and of the 
negative impact pollution is having on the environment. This case study looks at two 
areas of concern, water scarcity and the high levels of pollution. Both of these 
environmental issues present human security problems to the population and can 
potentially be sources of unrest if people fear their security is threatened. 
 
Water Scarcity 
 Water is a basic need, essential to human life, and without it, people cannot 
survive. Freshwater resources are becoming progressively scarce throughout China. 
China’s current rate of water usage is unsustainable. China’s rivers are drying up and 
what fresh water China does have is often unusable, due to the high level of pollutants.
72
 
China is facing a severe water crisis, a human security problem that could ultimately 
affect domestic stability. According to Chellaney, security issues posed by water 
shortages could include: political instability, lack of economic modernization, public 
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health, and food security.
73
 Water shortages in poor and underdeveloped regions of China 
could also cause mass migrations of environmental refugees.
74
 With water being essential 
to life, serious domestic unrest would ensue if China’s water shortage reaches critical 
levels. 
 China’s government is responding to its water crisis by building new 
infrastructure rather than establishing firm environmental reforms. They have begun 
work on a massive multi-decade water transfer project called the “South-North Water 
Transfer Project.” The idea is to transfer water through a set of channels up to northern 
city centers from the south, where water is more abundant.
75
 This program, however, has 
created further human security problems for the regime. It is estimated that so far the 
project has displaced 300,000 people from their homes.
76
  Residents have protested the 
project and removal from their land. According to Chellaney, collectively, Chinese 
government water projects have displaced over 22.9 million people, more than any other 
type of project in China.
77
  Displacement of people on this level can prove dangerous 
considering the large populace and its anger over a human security issue. Experts believe 
that when the project is finally complete, it will be of little use because the water being 
moved is so heavily contaminated and the resulting environmental damage from 
constructing the project is irreversible.
78
 China needs to focus on implementing reforms 
to protect its environment and resources at both the national and local levels. Without 
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addressing the severe water shortage in China, domestic violence could break out due to 
the human security need for water.  
 
Air Pollution 
 China has some of the world’s worst air pollution in the world. In fact, in some 
Chinese cities, the pollution is so severe that it is dangerous for people to be outside. In 
October 2013, in the northeastern city of Harbin, the smog was so thick that the city 
practically shut down for days while waiting for the conditions to improve.
79
 Air quality 
in China has continued to deteriorate as China has become more developed and relied on 
heavy industry, including burning high levels of coal, for economic growth.
80
  These air 
pollutants also have a negative effect on agriculture, animals, and ecosystems throughout 
China. Air, agriculture, and the environment are all things that humans depend on for 
survival. When pollution is so dangerously high that it negatively affects these aspects of 
Chinese life, human security is at stake. 
 These high levels of air pollutants have begun to cause health concerns in Chinese 
urban areas. According to Zhong Nanshan, the president of the China Medical 
Association, lung cancer and cardiovascular disease have drastically increased in Chinese 
urban centers due to the high levels of contaminants in the air.
81
 Zhong also warned that 
air pollution is more dangerous than SARS because people cannot escape air pollutants.
82
 
The problem is so severe that the United States Embassy in Beijing measures and reports 
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on the air quality and particulate matter from its facility in Chaoyang District of Beijing.  
At its peak in January 2013, the Embassy measurement hit 755 which extended beyond 
the air quality index chart measurements of between 0 and 500.
83
 This measurement was 
20 times greater than what the World Health Organization has established as being safe 
for humans.
84
 Air pollutants have also affected China’s agriculture and livestock. Plants 
and animals absorb pollution contaminants from their environment. As humans eat these 
products, they take in these toxins, causing severe health problems. With such high levels 
of pollution, human security is at risk in China.  
 Environmental problems such as the shortage of water and severe cases of 
pollution have already begun to stir activism throughout China. Now that China has 
transitioned from a totalitarian state to an authoritarian state with a market economy, 
citizens are less afraid of speaking out for their rights.
85
 Although most protests have not 
turned violent, their actions show that the Chinese people can mobilize and speak up for 
themselves. According to many academics, including Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, 
over the past two decades there has been a drastic increase in the number and size of 
organized protests throughout China.
86
 In 2006, the number of pollution-related protests 
was approximately 51,000 according to China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection.
87
 
Common sources of protest have included anger over industrial pollution, the call against 
new industrial development, and bringing attention to water pollution. In a country that 
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faces many of the same economic problems that were explored in the previous case study, 
combined with such extreme environmental problems, a hazardous human security 
environment that is very dangerous to the Chinese state is thus created. 
 
Personal Security 
The Chinese Communist Party has a poor record of personal security. The 1982 
Constitution guaranteed civil liberties to Chinese citizens in principle, but today the 
Chinese states do not practice them. From the perspective of the international community, 
along with non-governmental organizations, the Chinese government is an egregious 
human rights violator. The Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, as well as many 
countries, have accused China of human rights abuses including suppressing freedom of 
speech, movement, and religion. China infringes upon many other freedoms and rights to 
include political freedom, birth control rights, and the extreme use of capital punishment.  
As stated in the 2012 Human Rights Watch Report:  
China continues to be an authoritarian one-party state that imposes sharp curbs on 
freedom of expression, association, and religion; openly rejects judicial 
independence and press freedom; and arbitrarily restricts and suppresses human 




China argues that many of its policies are aimed at securing the state and maintaining 
stability. In order for China to remain in power, the officials feel the need to keep the 
population under strict control. Many civil rights groups argue, however, that Chinese 
policies go beyond protecting the state and infringe upon citizens’ individual rights. 
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Human rights violations can be a cause of internal conflict. If people feel their rights have 
been violated or their personal security is in jeopardy, violence is a possibility. 
 
Human Rights Violations 
 It is no secret that the Chinese media and internet are closely monitored and 
censored by the government. This close monitoring is a tool to maintain civil stability and 
overall control by the Communist Party. China has two main goals in monitoring its 
citizens. First, they want to keep the public from obtaining information that is viewed as 
detrimental or embarrassing to the regime. Subject matters including unrest, protests, and 
the Dali Lama have been previously censored in Chinese media.
89
 Second, the regime 
wants to keep the population from organizing into large groups that could potentially 
overthrow the government.
90
 In order to control the news, the Chinese media, to include 
news programs and newspapers, are all state-run. The media, therefore, only reports on 
stories that the government approves of. Any news that discusses unfavorable topics such 
as uprisings like the Arab Spring does not get coverage or the reports are limited.
91
 
Chinese citizens have access to the internet, but do not have the ability to freely express 
themselves on blogs or social media. China has a highly sophisticated system of internet 
censorship and a ‘Great Firewall’, which prevents outside sites from being accessed.
92
 
Some of the banned sites include Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. China has essentially 
created its own national internet. In 2009, following protests in Xinjiang province, the 
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Chinese government hit a kill switch on the internet in that area which lasted for over a 
year.
93
 Although censored, Chinese activists have been finding ways to communicate and 
get their messages out.  Activists in China use the internet with caution, aware of the 
censorship. Today, they are using Weibo, China’s form of Twitter, and microblogs to 
communicate. Some activists have even gone so far as to establish a system of code 
words in order to communicate around the firewall.
94
 Although China continues to arrest 
offenders and block sites, determined activists will continue to find ways around the state 
censorship. 
 The 1982 Chinese Constitution gives Chinese citizens the right of freedom of 
religion. Article 64 reads, “No state, public organization or individual may compel 
citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against 
citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal 
religious activities.”
95
 Although Chinese citizens have the right to religious beliefs on 
paper, it is far different in practice. Religion is closely monitored throughout China and 
religious practices are only allowed in government-approved places of worship.
96
 
According to the Human Rights Watch, religious institutions must have proper approvals 
and submit governmental paperwork on its activities, which are subject to audits and 
tracked by the regime.
97
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For example, Falun Gong is a spiritual discipline that focuses on a moral 
philosophy of truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance.
98
 The movement started in 
China in 1992, and by the late 1990s had a strong group of followers estimated at over 70 
million people, one of the largest nongovernmental organizations in China.
99
 Falun Gong 
brought together a wide range of devote followers from different backgrounds including: 
young people, older generations, rural communities, and urban dwellers.
100
 The spiritual 
group was able to mobilize large numbers of followers quickly and orderly thereby 
threatening the Chinese government.
101
 The strength of the group was apparent on April 
25, 1999 when over 10,000 Falun Gong members surrounded the Beijing government 
compound to stage a silent protest.
102
 Following this display of strength, the Chinese 
government grew wary of the group’s size and influence and began banning the practice 
and arresting the leadership. The regime feared such a large, organized group and the 
possibility of instability this presented. Although this is one group, the crackdown on 
Falun Gong sets a precedent for other organizations. Although officially banned, the 
group still exists throughout China, with members practicing in secret. 
 Human rights activists continue to be targeted as they operate secretly throughout 
China. The Chinese government continues to arrest and imprison anyone who speaks out 
on human rights violations. The more China continues to suppress its citizens’ rights, the 
more likely it is that conflict and unrest could ensue. As China continues to grow 
economically and the population has more access to technology and the international 
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community, they will likely demand more religious freedom. The citizens of China may 
also come to see the benefits of a free society as portrayed by western cultures, and 
demand these equal rights. In fact, in order for China to prosper domestically at the same 
levels as the United States they likely need to guarantee freedom and human rights to its 
citizens. The violations of personal security in China also continue to get international 
attention.  The international community continues to place pressure on the regime to give 
its citizens more rights and freedoms.  If China did allow for civil liberties the country 
would not only be more prosperous but the threat of unrest and instability in China would 
drastically decrease.   
 
Conclusions 
Until now, China has been able to quell protests and suppress the population.  The 
regime has yet to face any real unrest and has been successful in keeping a country of 
over one billion people stable. How long can the government continue to successfully do 
this? A massive economic, environmental or social disaster, where a large number of 
people are collectively organized, combined with international pressures, could result in a 
regime collapse in China. Some academics argue that China’s regime is rather stable and 
has not yet shown signs of weakness. Do not forget, however, that a communist regime 
stable in appearance has collapsed quite suddenly before. The Soviet Union, Eastern 
Europe and the Ukraine all collapsed without major warning signs due in large part to 
domestic factors such as those China currently faces.
103
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The large number of severe domestic problems the regime faces in China leads 
me to believe there is a high probability of unrest in China’s future. Currently, the 
conditions are not yet right for such a massive uprising; however, in time this will likely 
change. Economic growth in China has been the basis for continued stability throughout 
China for the last several decades. However, as more people face economic hardships as 
the growth in the Chinese economy begins to slow this could result in domestic unrest 
throughout China. Add in environmental problems and personal security upsets and 
China could soon be facing a large and discontent civilian population. A recent example 
of this was the Arab Spring which began in late 2010, and resulted in the overthrow of 
several governments as well as political change throughout the Middle East. Although the 
upheaval was the result of several factors including disenchantment with governments, 
economic decline, and human rights, this combination of factors made conditions ripe for 
instability. China faces many of the same problems that the Middle East did prior to the 
Arab Spring. Although Chinese citizens are more regulated than those in the Middle East, 
this censorship could exacerbate the problem. It is highly likely that China will see 
domestic unrest in its future as economic growth slows and more citizens face economic 
hardships. 
As China continues to grow economically, politically and internationally, it needs 
to remain focused on solving its looming domestic crises. Human security issues 
including high levels of unemployment, inequality, water scarcity, and human rights 
violations can lead to domestic unrest and ultimately topple China’s rise to power if left 
unresolved. As China becomes more developed, citizens will come to expect more 





The Chinese regime needs to work to reduce many of its human security problems that 
are directly connected to the onset of civil conflict. The widespread unemployment must 
be addressed, especially among the young adult population, who are more likely to 
participate in civil unrest. In order for stability to continue, Chinese economic growth and 
development must be maintained. Economic conditions in China are probably one of the 
most severe human security issues China faces today.  
Second, China must address the high levels of dangerous pollution throughout the 
country. The Chinese people are becoming ill due to poor environmental management.  
Protests over environmental degradation are increasing in number and size due to the 
problem’s severity and the government’s failure to respond.  
Lastly, China needs to further guarantee its citizens the basic human rights such as 
freedom of speech, religion and movement. Although this would mean less censorship 
and the potential for citizens to organize and overthrow the Communist Party, continuing 
to keep citizens suppressed, especially as they become more economically developed, 
may lead to even more civil conflict. The most likely scenario of further denying basic 
human rights would be unrest. China must act and deal with these looming problems 











CHAPTER 2: REGIONALLY: HOW CHINA’S RISING POWER 
AFFECTED RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
 
Asia is undergoing a transition in the twenty-first century. This region has some 
of the fastest growing economies, largest populations in the world, and significant 
amounts of global defense spending.  It is also home to China, who is a rising power, and 
possibly the next challenger to American hegemony.  Relations between China and its 
Southeast Asian neighbors are becoming increasingly important as China’s power 
continues to grow. China’s rising strength has made neighboring states anxious about 
future relations in the region. With tensions high in the region over territorial disputes, 
historical animosities, and differences in political ideologies, a shift in the balance of 
power could lead to conflict. Regional states’ response to China’s expanding influence 
will have a major impact on the future of relations in the region as China continues to 
grow more powerful.  
The focus of this chapter is to address how China’s rise to power is affecting its 
interstate relations in Southeast Asia. First, this chapter will explore the characteristics of 
a rising power and how this power shift will affect regional relations. This will be 
followed by a discussion of international relations literature focused on state alignment 
strategies in response to a rising state, which include: balancing, bandwagoning, hedging 
and engagement.  Lastly, three specific relationships will be explored—China’s relations 
with Vietnam, Burma and the Philippines—to investigate the impact of China’s rise to 





responding. If China’s rise to power is not managed in the near future, its relations with 





In 1978, China took a major step in reforming its economy by opening up its 
communist based markets to the world.  Since this transformation, China’s economy, 
military strength and political influence has been rapidly increasing, resulting in China’s 
position today as a rising power.  China’s rising strength has made neighboring states 
anxious about their relations with China and the new order of the region. A shift in the 
balance of power could lead to conflict due to escalating tensions over territorial disputes, 
historical animosities and differences in political ideologies. In order to protect 
themselves, weaker states can align either with or against a rising power. How China’s 
neighbors decide to align themselves is important in the future of the region.  
This literature review explores China’s rise to power and why a shift in regional 
power might impact relations with neighboring countries. It will also analyze the 
different state alignment strategies that a country may use when interacting with a rising 
power. There are two main alignment strategies in international relations theory that a 
state can use to protect itself from a power: balancing against the power or bandwagoning 
with the power.  Examining these theories and understanding why these strategies are 
used will help determine how China’s rise to power is affecting interstate relations in 
Southeast Asia and ways in which these states might respond. 
Understanding how China’s rise may impact regional relations is of vital 





China relies on the Southeast Asian states that form the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, better known as ASEAN, for economic benefit. In 2011, ASEAN became 
China’s third largest trader.
104
  China relies on these countries for imports including 
natural resources, mechanical and electrical products and agricultural produce.
105
 This 
region is also strategically important to China.  Currently, there are unresolved territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea, which is centrally located in the region.
106
 This conflict 
is largely based on control over the valuable oil reserves and important sea lanes, which 
are essential for trade routes and access between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.  Several 
Southeast Asian countries lay claim to portions of the sea and these disputes have been a 
source of contention in the region, only likely to escalate. China and its Southeast Asian 
neighbors are very closely connected through economic, geographical and political ties, 
which is why it is important to examine how China’s rise to power might affect relations 
in the region and how states in Southeast Asia are responding to China’s rise.  
Geographically, China has a large land mass and borders fourteen countries. 
Several of these neighbors are large and powerful and include states such as India, Russia, 
and Japan; countries with their own global influence, strong military capabilities and 
economic importance. Although this chapter focuses on China’s relations with its 
Southeast Asian neighbors, China’s regional location is notable. This location, amidst 
these other large and powerful countries, is why regional cooperation is key for China. As 
China continues to rise to power, the landscape potentially makes the region more 
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unstable as these other countries contend with China’s elevating status. China must 
manage its military capabilities and rising power in such a way as to not upset these 
potential rivals. This is why China’s soft power approach is vital to China’s rise, so not to 




Although it is clear that China has become more powerful over the last few 
decades, there is still a debate in academia and policy circles as to China’s actual intent as 
a rising power.  Perhaps China does not intend to be a full global power as the United 
States currently is. Several academics take this view including Sheng Ding, who suggests 
that China’s rise to power is based on soft power and therefore is not a threat to other 
nations. 
107
 Soft power is defined by Nye as, “The ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than through coercion or payments.”
108
 In other words, to spread 
diplomacy through policies, values or even cultural means. Ding presents the argument 
that, “In recent years, not only has China stayed away from military conflicts, but China 
has also become ever more compliant with international rules and norms.”
109
 By 
becoming a member of the World Trade Organization and participating in global 
missions such as anti-piracy missions, China has established itself as a global partner. 
China itself has denied reports that it wants to be a global hegemon and insists it is 
peacefully developing.  A recent Chinese government publication explains that, “peaceful 
development is a strategic choice made by China to realize modernization, make itself 
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strong and prosperous, and make more of a contribution to the progress of human 
civilization.”
110
 China does not want others to feel threatened by its power, especially its 
neighbors in Southeast Asia. China relies on relationships with its regional partners to 
stay strong in order to bolster its continued rise to power. David Kang also believes that 
China is not a threat to its neighbors because, “East Asian states actually believe China’s 
claims and hence do not fear…China’s rise.”
111
  These arguments, however, fail to 
consider recent Chinese aggressions in the South China Sea and how China’s neighbors 
to the south have begun to react to this behavior. It also does not account for China’s 
drastic increase in military spending. 
Even though China’s rise to power has been peaceful up to this point, there are no 
guarantees that China will continue down this path as it becomes more powerful and 
continues to strengthen its military. Rising powers in the past have been known to 
become more aggressive as they continue to gain power. Past examples of rising powers 
include the Soviet Union and the United States.  Both of these previous rising powers, for 
example, got drawn into a nuclear arms race as they were competing for global 
hegemony. China has begun to show aggressive this behavior as a rising power. It has 
become increasingly aggressive over territory in the South China Sea and the East Sea.  
As China’s power continues to increase, so does it influence over other states, possibly 
leading to conflict or tensions. Southeast Asian states are growing increasingly nervous 
over China’s aggressive behavior.  This anxiety is partly due to China’s past of invasion, 
conquest and control of many of these countries, which include Vietnam and Burma.  
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Many Southeast Asian countries find it hard to trust Chinese claims of a peaceful rise due 
to its aggressive past and current threats. A goal in many Southeast Asian countries has 
been to “keep larger outside countries from using their relative military strength or 
political influence to dominate regional affairs or to undermine the freedom of 
action….”
112
  In order to confront this rising threat, regional states have begun to utilize 
state alignment strategies.  
 
State Alignment Strategies 
 
In international relations theory, there are two main state alignment strategies in 
response to a rising power: bandwagoning and balancing. Bandwagoning and balancing 
are opposite positions a state can use to protect itself from a rising power.
113
 Several other 
strategies lie in between bandwagoning and balancing and include hedging and 
engagement. All four of these alignment strategies will be explained using international 




The definition and aims of bandwagoning continues to be debated in international 
relations theory. Walt defines bandwagoning as, alignment with the rising power to avoid 
the threat of future attacks or as a type of appeasement.
114
 Scheweller, however, explains 
bandwagoning as an alignment strategy to be on the winning side or to benefit from a 
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 Weaker states might not only be attracted to the strength of the 
rising power, but may want to share in the wealth that comes from aligning with someone 
more powerful.  When a state bandwagons with a rising power, they are essentially 
allowing a rival to gain more power, which according to realism is not usually in the 
state’s best interest.
116
 Although the weaker state may benefit from the relationship, so 
will the rising power who now has leverage over those who choose to bandwagon with 
them. For example, weaker states are more likely to choose bandwagoning, because not 
only do they have more to gain from a relationship with a stronger country, but they often 
have fewer options and little resources in order to balance a rising power. Alignment with 
China, for example, could lead to further economic benefits or military protection, as is 
the case with Burma.  Walt suggests that weaker states are also more vulnerable to 
pressure used by powers and therefore can be more likely to bandwagon.
117
 A state may 
want to bandwagon as a form of appeasement in hopes of avoiding conflict in the 
future.
118
  Lastly, a state might also bandwagon due to its geographic location.
119
 If a state 
is completely surrounded by rival countries it might have no choice but to bandwagon 
with them since it is essentially boxed in.  
Although many states in Southeast Asia depend on China, especially as an 
economic ally, bandwagoning has not been an overwhelmingly popular strategy in the 
region. Burma has traditionally been thought of as bandwagoning with China.  Laos and 
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Cambodia have also been placed into this bandwagoning category.
120
  These states that 
choose to bandwagon with China not only get Chinese protection but also aid, military, 
diplomatic, and economic relations. Burma for example receives Chinese military 
assistance, economic aid, and Chinese protection in the United Nations, in exchange for 
natural resources, and access to Indian Ocean ports.
121
 Kang presents the argument that 
regional states have traditionally bandwagoned with China in the past and they are likely 
to bandwagon in the future.
122
 He goes on to point out that, not only do these states have 
nothing to fear from China, but many of these states rely on the economic relationships 
they have established and therefore will side with China.
123
 Kang makes a strong 
argument against future balancing in the region; however, this argument is based on 
China’s continued peaceful rise to power. Acharya rejects Kang’s theory, arguing that 
many regional states do fear China’s rise and will therefore chose to balance this power, 
not align with it.
124
   This will be especially true if China’s rise becomes more violent, 




Balancing can be defined as actions taken by a state to prevent a stronger power 
from dominating it.
125
  Theorists have broken up balancing into two types—internal and 
external. Internal balancing is when a state focuses on its own capabilities to balance a 
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power, which might include building up its military strength, devising strategies, or 
stockpiling resources.
126
 On the other hand, external balancing is when a state focuses on 
making new alliances or increases its international cooperation in order to balance the 
rising power.
127
 Realists believe that states predominantly choose balancing over 
bandwagoning because it is in one’s interest to restrain a rising power before it becomes 
too powerful. Several theorists, including Waltz, argue that balancing is generally the 
more preferred and commonly used alignment strategy by both equal and middle powers 
against a rising power.
128
   Kang however criticizes this theory, arguing that it is based on 
a European model not appropriate for Asia due to the difference in history, politics, 
economics, and demography of the region. 
129
 What worked for Europe is not always best 
in Asia. Europe is not only historically, but politically different and international relations 
theories that worked for it may not apply to Asia. This theory also fails to see that 
although more often preferred, states do not always have the option to balance rising 
powers and in some cases they must choose to bandwagon with the rising power as 
discussed before.  
Although Waltz argues that balancing is the most preferred alignment strategy 
that does not seem to be the case in Southeast Asia. Ho Chung argues that explicit 
balancing in Southeast Asia has been rare, but elements of the balancing theory are being 
used against China by several countries including the Philippines, Taiwan and Japan.
130
 
Most states, however, are not fully balancing China for a couple of reasons.  First, many 
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countries in Southeast Asia are tied to China economically and do not want to harm that 
relationship.  Second, as Weitz argues, the countries of Southeast Asia could never fully 
balance Chinese power due to China’s size, manpower, equipment, and defense 
spending.
131
 In order for Southeast Asia to effectively balance China, it needs to bring in 
a larger outside power, such as the United States.  Some countries, including the 
Philippines, have begun to strengthen ties with the United States in recent years and will 
probably use US power to help balance China in the region. As China’s power and 
aggression increase balancing could become more widely used. 
 
 
Hedging and Engagement 
 
There are two middle ground alignment strategies between bandwagoning and 
balancing—hedging and engagement. Hedging, according to Roy, is a strategy where a 
state keeps its alignment options open against a future security threat.
132
 With hedging 
there is a certain amount of uncertainty on the part of the aligning state, because hedging 
is not a concrete strategy, such as bandwagoning or balancing. Engagement, another 
option, is where a state encourages the rising power to accept the rules of institutions and 
the international order.
133
 Schweller explains that the main goal of engagement is to make 
sure the expanding power is used for peace building and to avoid future conflict.
134
  One 
problem with the hedging and engagement theories is that it is hard to measure if a state 
is using these strategies since the terms are less defined then balancing or bandwagoning. 
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The lines between all these strategies can often become blurred making it difficult to 
distinguish the degree of hedging from balancing or bandwagoning.  
Several academics believe that hedging is a common alignment strategy prevalent 
in Southeast Asia.  Ho Chung describes the alignment pattern in Southeast Asia as, 
“resorting to the option of hedging…wishing to neither be dominated by the rising China 
nor to antagonize it….”
135
 Through this strategy states do not have to choose to be with 
or against Chinese power, instead they can resort to a middle ground. Southeast Asian 
countries that are thought of as hedging China include Vietnam, Malaysia and 
Indonesia.
136
 Roy argues that these states hedge Chinese power because they are not 
directly threatened to use a bandwagoning or balancing strategy.
137
 Although many of 
these states are nervous about Chinese rising power, they have other interests in China, 
such as strong economic relations, which they do not want to jeopardize over an 
alignment strategy.  
 
Other Alignment Considerations 
 
 Before a state decides on an alignment strategy there are several other factors that 
it must take into consideration. As Walt believes, there are several other threats to 
consider that may impact how a weaker state chooses to align. Walt lists these other 
threats as aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive 
intentions.
138
  First, a country’s aggregate power refers to strength in resources, such as 
population, industry, and technological capabilities that can pose a threat to others 
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because it gives a power strategic advantage.
139
 China’s aggregate power is formidable 
since it has the world’s largest population, and a booming economy along with 
acquisition of both technology and natural resources.   Second, states that are in a closer 
geographic proximity will pose a larger threat because the projection of power is greater 
the closer a rising power is.
140
 China has a large land mass that directly borders fourteen 
countries and is relatively close to several others, making it potentially an imposing threat 
to these neighbors. Applying political pressure and threatening military action is more 
effective and intimidating the less distance there is between countries. Third, Walt 
explains offensive power as a state’s “ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial 
integrity of another state.”
141
  China has been displaying its offensive power through the 
buildup and modernization of its military.  Lastly, a state who exhibits aggressive 
intentions is more likely to be a security threat and cause weaker states to align in order 
to avoid future conflict.
142
  China has been viewed as having aggressive intentions by 
some of its Southeast Asian neighbors and others, including the United States, over rights 
to the South China Sea.  All of these factors need to be taken into consideration by 





 It is clear that China has positioned itself as a rising power through its expanding 
economic markets, modernization of its military, and growing political power. Now that 
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China is a rising power and a threat to the region, many question how relationships will 
change and how China’s neighbors will react.  Although China has good relations with 
many of its neighbors, these are likely to deteriorate in the future. As China continues to 
gain power it will increasingly become more aggressive in an effort to secure its national 
interests and thus straining its relations. Many countries in Southeast Asia will therefore 
feel more threatened by Chinese power and begin to build up their militaries and look to 
improve relations with other powers, such as the United States. This will greatly impact 
relations in the region causing military tensions. China’s emerging power has already 
begun to affect its relations with states in Southeast Asia and transform the region. By 
examining China’s relationships with Vietnam, Burma and the Philippines this chapter 
will explore how these countries are reacting to China’s rising power and how it is 




Relationships between China and its regional neighbors have changed and 
transformed as China has risen in power. In examining China’s interstate relations with 
other Southeast Asian countries and demonstrating that these countries are increasingly 
more threatened by Chinese power, this chapter will focus on three specific relationships 
between China and a Southeast Asian state in detail. This chapter has been organized into 
three comparative case studies, each selected based on their historic relationships with 
China and how they have previously aligned themselves. These three case studies will 
examine Chinese relations with Vietnam, Burma, and the Philippines. Each of these 





Because there are so many countries in Southeast Asia and in order to best understand 
how these relations are changing in the region due to China’s rise, countries with a wide 
range of interstate relations with China were chosen. For example, Burma has had very 
friendly relations and a strong alliance with China, while on the other hand the 
Philippines have had less diplomatic ties to China and tend to view China’s rise as a 
direct threat. Vietnam’s relations with China in the past have tended to be in-between 
Burma’s friendliness and the Philippines’ wariness and represent a middle ground 
relationship.  By looking at relationships with China on a wide spectrum this chapter will 
be able to explore how China’s rise is not only affecting relations with these specific 
countries, but how it could affect states with similar relations in the region as well.  
All three case studies have been constructed to analyze interstate relations 
between China and these selected countries in the past, present and future.  First, a brief 
historical account of relations between China and the selected state will be presented in 
order to establish a baseline for what relations were like before China’s rise to power. 
This historic portion will be limited to looking at relations since 1978 when China began 
to open its markets and engage with countries as the modern China that is recognized 
today. Next, each relationship will then be looked at from both the Chinese perspective as 
well as from the other state’s viewpoint.  The main issues of importance will be examined 
and largely categorized under political, economic, or military relations.  Particular 
attention will be given to how the selected state seems to be responding to the threat of 
China’s rising power and if it is taking any action to address this threat. Finally, this 
chapter will explore how these interstate relations will change in the future as China 





that Southeast Asian countries are progressively feeling more threatened by China’s 
power and aggressive behaviors and are cautiously looking for options to counter this 
threat. 
 
China-Southeast Asian Relationships  
China-Vietnam 
  
 China and Vietnam have a long history of conflict, mixed with periods of 
cooperation.  Throughout modern history, the Chinese have invaded Vietnam numerous 
times, causing Vietnam to be suspicious of Chinese intensions, especially now with its 
increasing power.  Relations between China and Vietnam were strong initially during the 
Vietnam War, when China came to the aid of North Vietnam in order to fight the 
Americans.
143
 Relations shifted between these two communist neighbors near the end of 
the Vietnam War, as Vietnam invaded Cambodia, upsetting diplomatic ties. Tensions 
eventually escalated to conflict, which lead to the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War between 
China and Vietnam.
 144
  This war caused a stalemate in relations that lasted over a decade. 
Finally, in 1991 China and Vietnam reached an agreement to normalize both state and 
military relations.
145
 Interstate relations continued to strengthen and in 1999 both 
countries signed a treaty to end land border disputes on the Sino-Vietnamese border.
146
 
Political, state, and military relations have greatly improved since the early 1990’s 
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leading to China and Vietnam’s strategic partnership, which was signed in 2008.
147
 
Although relations between the two neighbors have improved since the end of the Cold 
War, China’s rise to power has added another dimension to this complex history. 
  
 
 Chinese Perception of Relations with Vietnam 
 Relations with Vietnam are extremely important from the Chinese perspective. 
China looks to Vietnam as a strong strategic partner, in part because of the similar 
communist political structure.  Although relations between these two countries have not 
always been amiable, China relies on its relationship with Vietnam for several reasons. 
The most important aspect of this relationship for China is the economic ties. Vietnam 
provides China with needed natural resources, electrical components, along with many 
other goods.
148
  Over the past decade, China has increased the use of its soft power to 
engage with Vietnam, largely to diffuse the negative perceptions of China’s rise.  China 
also wants to continue good relations with Vietnam in order to keep its southern border 
stable.  
 
Vietnamese Perception of Relations with China 
Although China and Vietnam are currently in a period of cooperation, Vietnam 
has long feared invasion and domination by its larger and more influential neighbor, 
China.
149
  Vietnam has reason to be concerned about its neighbor’s rise to power for 
several reasons.  First, Vietnam is a rather small country compared to China—physically 
the size of one of China’s twenty-two provinces and a total population the size of one of 
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China’s large cities. Second, China is located directly across a border that is relatively flat 
and easily crossed with a large military force. Just over thirty years ago, China invaded 
Vietnam and today it still remains a vivid memory by many Vietnamese.
150
  Lastly, China 
is becoming extremely influential on several fronts including politically, militarily, and 
economically, which could be perceived by Vietnam as a threat. Although Vietnam has 
much to be concerned over China’s rising power, it also has the potential to gain greatly 
from a relationship with its stronger neighbor. Having established both Vietnam and 
China’s perceptions of their relationships with one another, further analysis is needed on 
issues of importance between these two countries and how China’s rise to power is 
affecting the interstate relationship.  
 
Chinese-Vietnamese Economic Relations 
 In 2011, China bypassed Japan for the spot as the world’s second largest 
economy.
151
  China’s economy has grown on average 9 percent a year for the last 
decade.
152
  Because China is such a large economic force, many neighboring states, 
including Vietnam, have economic interests in China. China, however, also relies on 
these economic relations, which are key to keeping its economy strong and rate of growth 
high. Currently, China and Vietnam have mutual trade agreements, foreign direct 
investments, and several economic development projects between them.
153
 Although 
there are economic ties, China’s rise to power has already begun to negatively affect its 
economic relationship with Vietnam.  For example, China expends time and resources 
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reassuring its economic partners, such as Vietnam, that its rise to power is peaceful and 
will continue to be in the future.  China, however, has not demonstrated this position as it 
has become more aggressive over disputed territory in the South China Sea, affecting this 
relationship. Although trade has not stopped or diminished due to the conflict, China’s 
economic partners, especially Vietnam, are now more wary and continue to look to 
diversify trade relations since China has become unpredictable.  Since the mid-1990’s, 
Vietnam has been joining multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
154
  Although there are various reasons 
for Vietnam to join these organizations, one benefit is that these institutions can help 
protect Vietnamese interests and buffer Chinese power.
155
  Overall, Vietnam may be 
wary of China’s expanding power, but they are still very dependent on the economic 
relationship with China. This relationship is largely why Vietnam has maintained a 
hedging alignment strategy and has not fully balanced China. In the future, it is likely that 
Vietnam will continue to try to diversify its economic relationships and be less dependent 
on China. 
 
Chinese-Vietnamese Security Relations 
China and Vietnam’s economic relationship has changed to a small extent, but 
China’s rising power has had an even greater impact on these two countries security 
relationship.  Not only is the China-Vietnam land border a concern for Vietnam, as 
discussed earlier, but so are the unresolved territorial claims in the South China Sea.  In 
fact, today the main source of tension between China and Vietnam lies specifically in the 
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competing claims over territory in the South China Sea. Both China and Vietnam claim 
islands in the sea as their own. This conflict has intensified as China has become more 
powerful and therefore more aggressive in the quest to claim what it believes to be its. 
Recently China has not only declared bans on fishing, but also cut the lines of 
Vietnamese exploratory oil vessels and detained Vietnamese fishing boats.
156
 Although 
these disputes have been ongoing for over six decades, tensions are currently higher than 
they have been in years. By seizing ships and cutting oil lines, China is provoking other 
countries in the region, including Vietnam. This increased aggression by the Chinese is 
due to its rising power.  As China has become the larger power in the region, it has been 
more forceful in using its power to acquire what is in its best interest, regardless of 
regional relations. 
China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea has especially affected its 
relationship with Vietnam.  From Vietnam’s perspective, China is invading its territory 
and challenging its sovereignty.  As China has grown bolder, so has Vietnam, by defying 
China and defending what it also believes to be its. Although Vietnam has not yet 
reached the point of balancing Chinese power over this issue, this will most likely change 
in the future.  As security relations between China and Vietnam have deteriorated, 
Vietnam has been actively increasing its ties with the United States.  Directly following 
the latest trouble over territory in the South China Sea, Vietnam immediately invited the 
United States to participate in a week long joint naval exercise.
157
 Due to the immediate 
scheduling, this exercise was a direct response to China’s rising power and Vietnam’s 
disapproval for China’s aggressive behavior. As Vietnam continues to increase its 
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engagement with the United States, it is very likely that Vietnam will look to the United 
States to help balance Chinese power. Intervention by the United States over this dispute 
will be further explored in the final chapter. 
Although China and Vietnam willingly cooperate, relations have changed since 
China began its ascent to power.  China has increased its use of soft power to convince its 
neighbors that its increasing strength is of no threat. Vietnam, meanwhile, has been 
focused on diversifying its relations with several countries within and outside the region.  
By joining multilateral organizations like ASEAN and building a strong military 
relationship with the United States, Vietnam is hoping to buffer Chinese power.
158
  It is 
very likely that Vietnam will continue to forge these military and economic relations with 
other states in order to resist Chinese power. Over time, depending on future Chinese 
aggression, Vietnam could shift from its current alignment strategy of hedging to 
balancing Chinese power.  This shift has probably begun as it continues engaging with 
the United States. A future struggle for Vietnam, or other similar Southeast Asian 
countries, who do not want to fully balance China with the power of the United States, 
will be finding middle ground between the two powers. Vietnam does not want to 
become overly dependent on either China or the United States; however, it needs to be 
careful not to end up trapped between the two powers in the future. 
 
China-Burma Relations 
 China and Burma have been historically thought of as close allies since the late 
1980’s and this relationship has continued into the twenty-first century. It is important to 
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look at a historically strong relationship to see how China’s rise to power is affecting 
relations with one of its closest allies in Southeast Asia. Even as the international 
community placed sanctions on Burma in the late 1990’s, China remained a close ally, 
and continued to provide the country with economic aid and over $1.4 billion worth of 
military weaponry.
159
 Burma has long been categorized as bandwagoning with Chinese 
power for both protection and profit.
160
  China also capitalizes on this relationship for its 
own gain. In fact, the relationship seems to be based on a mutual need and has commonly 




China-Burma Individual Perceptions of Relations 
 The Chinese relationship with Burma has been and continues to be largely based 
on military affairs, economic development, and trade relations. Although both parties 
have benefited from this relationship, China is specifically focused on securing natural 
resources and gaining a strategic position in the Indian Ocean byway of Burma.
162
 China 
seems to view its relationship with Burma as secure and stable, largely because Burma 
remains cut off from much of the world and therefore does not have diverse interstate 
relationships.  China however should not be too confident in this relationship due to the 
threat of its rise in power and a changing political climate in Burma. 
 In the past twenty years, Burma has been very dependent on its relationship with 
China. Sanctions largely cut Burma off from much of the world, causing them to become 
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reliant on China for most of its military and economic support.
163
  Burma has also looked 
to China to provide protection and watch out for its interests in global institutions, such as 
the United Nations, where it has no representation itself.
164
  China has offered economic 
assistance, including development projects that have built critical transportation and 
energy infrastructure throughout Burma.
165
 Due to Burma’s isolation, it has had few 
options for alignment strategies against China, resulting in its bandwagoning strategy. 
This strategy, however, could change as Burma reforms and sanctions are dropped.  
Although Burma has not publically voiced concern over China’s rise to power, Burma’s 
recent diplomatic actions including, warming relations with the United States, could 
possibly be related to the threat China’s rise to power poses and its need to diversify 
relations.  By looking more in depth at Chinese-Burmese diplomatic and military 
relations, the effect of Chinese rising power on this relationship and what the future holds 
will become more apparent. 
 
Chinese-Burmese Diplomatic Relations 
China’s rising power has increasingly begun to affect diplomatic relations 
between China and Burma. Even though Burma has traditionally bandwagoned with 
China, Burma has recently begun to distance itself from the rising power.  As described 
earlier, China has been investing in Burmese infrastructure for many years. For example, 
in 2006 a Chinese power company and the Burmese government signed an agreement for 
the Chinese to construct a $3.6 billion dollar dam project.
166
  After construction of the 
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project was already underway, in September of 2011, Burmese President Thein Sein 
abruptly suspended the project. It was reported that the project was suspended due to lack 
of popular support by the Burmese people.
167
  It is, however, speculated that the dam was 
suspended to lessen Burmese dependence on China and to keep the Chinese government 
out of Burmese domestic issues.
168
 Suspension of this project is significant because this is 
the first instance where the Burmese government has denied China the right to continue a 
development project inside Burma’s borders. As of 2014, this project has remained 
suspended. The decision to suspend the construction of the dam has put some strain on 
the diplomatic relationship between China and Burma and also signaled to China and the 
world that Burma is not controlled by its neighbor.  Perhaps Burma is trying to alter the 
perception that it is always aligned with China. 
 Burma is not only suspending development projects to become less reliant on 
China, but it has also begun to diversify its foreign relationships by entering into 
diplomatic negotiations with other states, particularly the United States. As China’s 
power continues to rise, Burma does not want to find itself fully dependent on one state 
that has proven itself aggressive and unpredictable in the past.  In December of 2011, 
Burma welcomed and hosted then United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to 
begin the process of normalizing relations.
169
 Since 2011, the United States and Burma 
have continued to work together. Sanctions were partially lifted in 2012 and the visa ban 
on Burmese rulers and business partners was also rescinded.
170
 This is another example 
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of how Burma is slowly distancing itself from China, becoming less dependent on them. 
China’s reaction to this Burma’s opening has been mixed.  The Chinese government 
publically welcomed the announcement, while Chinese state media was more 
outspoken.
171
 The China Daily expressed at the time of Clinton’s visit that,  
Some commentators now fear that Clinton's visit could affect Myanmar's ties with 
China. Such worries are unwarranted, for the foundation of China-Myanmar ties is 
not that fragile. China-Myanmar border is now one of peace, friendship and 




Although Burma’s feelings regarding China’s rising power have not been made public, it 
is clear that Burma is pulling back and expanding its interstate relationships to eventually 
be less reliant on the People’s Republic of China.  
 
Chinese-Burmese Military Ties 
 Military relations have been a key component of China and Burma’s relationship. 
Burma has required both military arms and training, while China has relied on Burma’s 
strategic geographic location in the region.  China has provided Burma with much of its 
military equipment over the past twenty years including jets, armored vehicles, and 
ships.
173
 China in return, benefits by gaining access to Burmese ports along the Indian 
Ocean. Strategically, China needs this access due to its ongoing conflicts with India, as it 
lacks its own access to the Indian Ocean or ports in the region.  Because of this strategic 
advantage, China has been focused on the development of ports in Burma, which will 
give them the ability to enter the Bay of Bengal for economic benefit and to dock military 
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 As China becomes more aggressive about acquiring access to the Indian 
Ocean through Burma, military relations could be affected due to Burma distancing itself 
and wanting China removed from its domestic affairs. In fact, military relations have not 
always been completely smooth. In 2009, for example, relations grew tense between the 
two countries after Burma attacked and expelled the Kokang insurgent group causing 
thousands of refugees to flood into China.
175
 Although Burma has aligned itself and is 
usually on good terms with China, Burma has not always listened to Beijing or consulted 
with them before acting. In the future, Burma will likely continue to proceed without 
consulting China as it works to break itself away from China’s grasp. 
 As Burma continues to form stronger relations with other countries, China has 
grown increasingly nervous over these relationships, specifically with the United States. 
Beijing feels the need to cement its relationship, particularly military relations. In fact, 
directly after announcing Secretary Clinton’s visit back in 2011, China invited top 
Burmese military officials to Beijing in an effort for the two militaries to “strengthen 
exchanges, deepen cooperation and play an active role in pushing forward the 
development of comprehensive relations.” 
176
 Both sides agreed to more high level visits, 
training, and equipment cooperation in the future.
177
 Burma is extremely important for 
China’s strategic position and the Chinese are worried that closer relations with the 
United States could interfere with the strong China-Burma relationship and more 
importantly China’s access to natural resources and the Indian Ocean. Even though 
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Burma has begun to lessen its dependence on China, it still wants and needs Chinese 
military support. Although Burma is looking to diversify, at the same time it wants to 
continue to have a good relationship with China in the future without being completely 
dependent on them. 
 
Future of Chinese-Burmese Relations 
Despite China’s rising power, relations between China and Burma are still strong, 
but beginning to change. Although Burma has not publically spoken of its concern over 
China’s increasing power it has begun to take steps to lessen the threat of rising China. 
This has affected current relations with China. Diplomatically, Burma has begun to 
distance itself from China by suspending development projects and seeking closer 
relations with several other countries.  China continues to push for a strong military 
relationship with Burma in order to secure its alliance. Previously this was not a concern 
for China, but as Burma begins to diversify its relations, China has become more 
apprehensive that it may lose these ties. Burma has been historically viewed as 
bandwagoning with China, however, this will likely change in the future. It is not 
expected that Burma will ever fully balance China, but Burma will continue to move 
away from a bandwagoning strategy and more towards a hedging strategy. The future of 
Burmese-Chinese relations will greatly depend on how Burma moves forward on the 
international stage. Regardless, Burma has begun to position itself to be less dependent 







China – Philippines Relations 
 The Philippines have been historically viewed as a strong balancer towards 
Chinese power.
178
  It has also been the most vocal country in Southeast Asia about the 
threat of rising China and the affect it will have on the region.
179
 China and the 
Philippines have not had a historically strong relationship. In fact, out of the three cases, 
this relationship has been the most tense. This is in part because of ongoing territorial 
disputes, but also because the Philippines have and remain close allies to the United 
States. The Philippines has been very anxious and uncertain about Chinese rising power, 
which also has greatly impacted relations.  
China and the Philippines normalized relations in 1975 and both sides have since signed 
several bilateral agreements allowing for deeper trade and diplomatic relations.
180
  This 
relationship, however, has changed largely due to Chinese increased power and 
aggression and the Philippines’ uncertainty over China’s intentions. Relations between 
both countries significantly deteriorated following a 2012 naval standoff in the South 
China Sea. 
 
China-Philippine Military Relations 
As China’s power has risen, military relations between China and the Philippines 
have greatly deteriorated, in part, because of the territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea.  As discussed in the Vietnam portion, China has become more aggressive over its 
territorial claims and has made a strong effort to protect these waters, inciting some 
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Southeast Asian countries, especially the Philippines, and causing naval standoffs. The 
Philippines have also been one of the few countries in Southeast Asia to directly stand up 
to Chinese aggression. In April 2012, the Philippines refused to back down as China sent 
naval vessels in to the disputed area to protect Chinese boats who were fishing illegally. 
The Philippines confronted these illegal fishermen and found themselves involved in a 
naval standoff with the Chinese.  Although this dispute did not escalate into a larger 
conflict, it took over two months to end the standoff.
181
 This incident did change relations 
between China and the Philippines. China imposed a fishing ban on the entire South 
China Sea while the Philippines boycotted some Chinese goods.
182
 This confrontation has 
intensified the dispute between China and Philippines and could lead to a future clash as 
frustration over the situation escalates.  
The Philippines, however, has already taken several steps to balance Chinese 
power including expansion and modernization of its military forces—specifically its 
navy—and negotiations with the United States over military training and ports to dock 
US military ships.
183
 Not only have they negotiated with the US, but the Philippines have 
signed a mutual defense treaty where the US will come to its aid in the event of a military 
confrontation.
184
 The United States has said publically that they would provide assistance 
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China-Philippine Diplomatic Relations 
China and the Philippines diplomatic relations have become increasingly strained 
due to the South China Sea dispute and the Philippines close relations with the United 
States. In fact, China has recently distanced itself the Philippines. In 2013, the Chinese 
foreign minister met with counterparts from all of the ASEAN member states, expect for 
the Philippines.
186
 China’s lack of diplomatic relations towards the Philippines has been 
labeled diplomatic isolation.
187
 Furthermore, following the devastating Typhoon Haiyan, 
intentional aid poured in from around the world. China, the powerhouse of the region, 
gave a measly $100,000 to help in the effort.
188
 Through these actions China is sending 
the Philippines a sign regarding the state of affairs. Although China and the Philippines 
have never had a strong relationship, relations have significantly deteriorated since the 
military standoff in the South China Sea in 2012. Relations were further damaged when 
the Philippines announced it was filing a suit against China over its South China Sea 
claims in a United Nations tribunal.
189
 China maintains that it has not broken 
international law and refuses to participate in the tribunal.
190
 Recommendations from the 
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Future of Chinese-Philippine Relations 
The Philippines have begun to balance Chinese rising power in anticipation of a 
future conflict. Tensions continue to build between China and the Philippines with 
neither side working to diffuse the conflict. Instead the Philippines continue to expand its 
defense capabilities and China exercises its increased power to secure its territory, 
provoking conflict. The future of relations between these two countries is something of 
concern. With each aggressive move by China, the Philippines balance China more 
assertively. This example proves Walt’s balancing theory, noted in the literature review, 
where countries are likely to balance in order to stay independent of a rising power.  This 
case study also demonstrates how important it is to bring in an outside actor to be able to 
fully balance China, such as the Philippines is doing with the United States. 
Going forward, the Philippines’ decision to balance China’s rising power will 
likely have a deteriorating effect on its mutual diplomatic and economic relations. China 
has been displeased with the Philippines decision to deepen its relationship with the 
United States. In order to avoid deteriorating relations, China will need to back off from 
the South China Sea dispute and be less aggressive in its attempts to lay claim to the 
territory.  Additionally, the Philippines will need to refrain from being so vocal against 
China’s rise to power. Although the Philippines decision to balance China has not yet 
affected other states alignment strategies towards China in the region, others could soon 









 If China’s rise to power is not managed in the near future its relations with its 
Southeast Asian neighbors will continue to suffer as a result. In fact, some relationships 
between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors have already been negatively impacted 
due to China’s expanding power. As demonstrated through several case studies, 
Southeast Asian countries have begun to take steps to distance themselves and become 
less reliant on this rising power. In all three cases examined, each country has begun to 
strengthen relations with outside countries, specifically the United States, who is one of 
the few powers with the ability to counter Chinese power. They are also becoming more 
reliant on each other through organizations like ASEAN. Although only three countries 
were focused on in the case studies, it can be expected that others in Southeast Asia are 
also looking to diversify their foreign relations away from China. Some countries have 
even begun to strengthen their militaries in response to the threat of China’s rise.  
Ongoing territorial disputes have also hurt diplomatic relations. Although economic ties 
remain strong between Southeast Asian countries and China, tense military and 
diplomatic relations could come to affect these economic relations in the future. If things 
continue as they are China will have difficulty working with several of its neighbors. The 
Chinese need to better manage its rise to power by being less aggressive and cautious in 










CHAPTER 3: GLOBALLY: CHINA’S ASSERTION OVER THE SOUTH CHINA 





Although the United States leads the world in economic, political, and military 
power, China could ultimately challenge US hegemony and change the international 
balance of power. As China continues to grow in strength, the China-US relationship is 
becoming more important. Both countries strategically distrust one another and are 
arguably balancing against each other, increasing the likelihood of a security dilemma, in 
which each country interprets the other’s defensive measures as a threat to its own 
security. This posturing between the United States and China is evident in the ongoing 
South China Sea dispute, where economic and strategic interests are at stake. China has 
grown more aggressive with its neighbors over its perceived territorial rights. This 
aggressive behavior combined with China’s mammoth defense budget, increasing naval 
power, and attempts to secure alliances, has raised the level of tension in the region. As 
China’s rise to power and aggressive behavior has increased in the South China Sea, the 
US level of alertness has also been elevated. The United States has become involved in 
the regional conflict as a result of threats against US allies and US interests, and the 
freedom of navigation. To counter China’s aggression, the United States has been 
actively strengthening relationships and alliances in the region, and recently announced a 
military refocus on the Asia-Pacific region. These actions by both states are focused on 
securing themselves and their allies against one another, potentially causing a security 
dilemma. The future of US-Chinese relations is currently being played out over the South 





This chapter examines if China’s level of assertion over its territorial rights in the 
South China Sea affects its relations with the United States. First, this chapter will 
examine literature looking at arguments both for and against China’s rise to power as a 
threat to the United States. This literature will include a detailed examination of the 
security dilemma theory and if this could potentially occur between the US and China, as 
China’s power increases. Second, three periods of the South China Sea conflict will be 
explored as case studies in order to understand Chinese actions and US responses and 
how this relationship has changed as China has secured more power. The two historical 
case studies from 1974 and 1988 will provide a baseline of Chinese aggression in the 
South China Sea along with US responses prior to China becoming a rising power. The 
third case study, dating from 2010 to present day, will examine how Chinese aggression 
and the US response have changed with China’s power status. Although the South China 
Sea conflict is only one portion of the China-US relationship, it is significant to the future 
of relations between these two countries.  This chapter concludes that US policy in the 
South China Sea has greatly shifted over the past three years. This is not due to increased 
Chinese assertion but rather to China’s rising power and increase in military capabilities. 
China now has the power to support its verbal claims. 
 
Literature Review 
 In order to better understand US reactions to Chinese levels of assertion in the 
South China Sea, this chapter will first examine the different viewpoints on China’s rise 
to power. There are generally two views of China's rise: that it poses a threat to US power 





China’s rise is a threat to the US will be discussed. Through this argument, the literature 
review will examine the international relations theory of a security dilemma and look at 
literature that discusses if such an occurrence is likely. Second, the literature review will 
examine works which highlight how China’s rise to power is for peaceful development 
and should not be considered a threat to the United States. It is possible that China does 
not have the intent to utilize its new power and capabilities. Lastly, the literature review 
will briefly glimpse into US-Chinese relations over the past three decades. 
        Throughout Asia, different names are used to refer to the South China Sea. Both the 
territory and the terminology are in dispute. For example, in Vietnam it is called the East 
Sea, in the Philippines, the West Philippine Sea. In this thesis, the term South China Sea 
will be used as it is the name most commonly used in the English language and does not 
reflect a side of this dispute. 
 
Security Dilemma 
 Realists argue that the international system is anarchic; each state’s main concern 
is its own survival. States, therefore, naturally distrust each other and as a result focus on 
efforts to increase national security. In order for a state to survive, it must also seek an 
increased power status.
191
 As a result of this anarchic system and resulting increase of 
security and power, a security dilemma can transpire. Herz explains a security dilemma: 
Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, 
concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or 
annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such 
attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the 
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impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and 
compels them to prepare for the worst. 
192
   
 
Other states feel less secure due to the increased security measures taken by another. This 
action can lead to competition as a state responds to having a sense of lowered security, 
and can negatively harm diplomatic relations. Herz goes on to argue that the security 
dilemma is an ongoing cycle; the competition for security and power is never ending.
193
 
Similarly, Robert Jervis defines a security dilemma as “many of the means by which a 
state tries to increase its security, decrease the security of others.”
194
  The security 
dilemma theory is instrumental in understanding how states with similar goals end up at 
odds with each other or even at war.
195
 Although neither side usually intends conflict, this 
can often be the result.  
 Jervis identifies two main variables that help to define the severity of a security 
dilemma. These variables are whether defensive weapons can be differentiated from 
offensive ones, and whether the defensive or offensive side has the advantage in the 
conflict.
196
 Depending on which variables are present, the intensity of the dilemma and 
threat of conflict is determined. The first of the four cases Jervis presents is when 
offensive and defensive behaviors are not discernible, but the benefit is in the offense’s 
favor. In this scenario, the security dilemma is very intense and highly dangerous because 
neither side can tell what the other is doing, and according to Jervis, an arms race or 
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conflict is more likely.
197
 The second scenario is where offensive and defensive behaviors 
are not discernible, but the defense has the advantage. In this case the security dilemma is 
less intense, and a state can increase its security without being a threat to other states or 
cause a pending conflict.
198
 The third case is when offense and defensive measures are 
distinguishable, but offensive has the favor. This type of security dilemma is not intense. 
Although there is the future risk of conflict, the current environment is stable.
199
 The final 
scenario that Jervis presents is where offensive and defensive behavior is discernible and 
defense has the overall advantage. Jervis believes that this security dilemma is the safest 
because states focus on its own defenses rather than building offensive capabilities.
200
 
This theory is important when examining the US-China case in determining the severity 
of a security dilemma, if it exists. 
China’s increasing military spending, capabilities, heightened aggression, and 
overall rise to power can be perceived as a threat to the United States. Supporting this 
argument is the fact that China’s military spending has skyrocketed over the last two 
decades, estimated to be around $100 billion in 2012, an increase of $60 billion a year, 
since 2002.
201
 This large amount of spending is a threat based on the new technology and 
capabilities China has been able to develop. Much of the military power China is 
developing is not for peaceful means. “The PLA's growing capabilities are designed to 
slowly, but inexorably, shift the regional military balance in China's favour until its 
neighbours conclude that there is little America can do to assist them.”
202
 China continues 
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to develop ballistic missiles, anti-cruise missiles, and aircraft carriers, all of which 
present a threat to China’s neighbors and US interests in the region.
203
 China is an 
extremely large and powerful country that can easily dominate or defeat its much smaller 
neighbors with these capabilities. As explored in the previous chapter, China’s neighbors 
have begun to explore other options to lessen reliance and even balance China, who they 
perceive as a rising threat. China does not need to establish intent to use these new 
capabilities.  By securing weapons systems and new defense technology China has 
possibly already created a security dilemma with the United States.  
          Many argue that a security dilemma is already underway between the United 
States and China.
204
 Both countries appear to have shifted apart diplomatically over the 
past several years, due to not only China’s rise, but also China’s increased aggression and 
the US pivot to Asia. Dong argues that, “Underlying the growing strategic distrust is an 
emerging security dilemma…between Beijing and Washington.”
205
 Both sides have 
arguably begun to rebalance and counterbalance one another. China and the United States 
both continue to develop weapon systems to use in a future conflict over the South China 
Sea and continue to strengthen alliances in the region.
206
 China wants to continue its rise 
to power, while the United States is becoming anxious about this rise and its effect on US 
interests in the region. “The two powers are increasingly trapped in an action-reaction 
cycle, so much so that many lament that the United States and China are doomed for a 
                                                          
203
 Singer, “Inside China’s Secret Arsenal,” 44. 
204
 Wang Dong, “Addressing the US-China Security Dilemma,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 17 January 2013, at http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/17/addressing-u.s.-china-security-
dilemma/f2rv; Robert Manning, “ The US-China Security Dilemma,” Global Times, 2 July 2013, at 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-uschina-security-dilemma. 
205
 Wang Dong. 
206







 These steps that both China and the United States are taking will 
be further explored in the last case study. 
This security dilemma is not just a result of China’s rising power, but also due to 
the United States reaction to the power increase. Yang Yi, a retired rear-admiral of the 
Chinese Navy, believes that both countries may be on the road to a security dilemma, but 
this is primarily because of US Cold War mentality and its strategic orientation in East 
Asia.
208
 Yang argues that perhaps the United States is the actual aggressor in the South 
China Sea and China is only responding to threats from the US. He believes that China, 
although increasing its military strength and rising to power, has done so through 
peaceful methods.
209
 "...Beijing has always called for resolving them [disputes] through 
diplomatic negotiations, not reliance on military superiority, intimidation, or threats."
210
 
According to this argument, the security dilemma exists because of US pursuit of 
interests in the Asian region, not because of China’s increase capabilities. 
  
China's Rise to Power is Not a Threat 
        The second argument is that China's rise to power and higher levels of assertion over 
its territorial rights is not a threat to the United States and therefore does not cause a 
security dilemma. China continues to maintain that its continued rise and increased power 
is for peaceful development and not a threat to the region, the United States, or global 
security. Chinese leadership has been cautious with its rise and used soft power as a 
means to reassure its neighbors and the world that it has no intentions of being a world 
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power or an aggressor.  Bates and Yanzhong state, “Since the 1990s, China has achieved 
impressive gains both in terms of soft power resources and the ability to convert the 
resources into desired foreign-policy outcomes.”
211
 China is very successful at getting 
policy decisions through peaceful means and does not need to use hard measures. As part 
of this peaceful development, China has continued to forge partnerships with neighboring 
countries and strategic relationships with other rising powers.
212
 China has also continued 
to promote trade alliances, both regionally and globally, especially in Africa and Latin 
America. China has been able to use soft power as a means to secure closer relationships 
and establish that it is not a threat. 
Besides China’s soft power approach, there are several other reasons why China’s 
does not consider its rise a threat. First, China is bound by high levels of interconnection 
on the international level. As Roy states, China’s larger economic goals outweigh its need 
for assertion over these territorial claims.
213
 China, its neighbors, and the United States 
are all highly economically dependent on one another and China would not want to risk 
these partnerships or an economic downturn over an island dispute. China also faces 
many domestic problems as noted in chapter one, which are top priority for the regime. 
The country cannot risk instability at home over a territorial problem.  
Third, although China is building up its military, it is argued this is for defensive 
purposes and China restrains itself by first using diplomatic means. For example, rather 
than escalating disputes in 2011 with Vietnam over oil survey ships, China signed a 
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bilateral agreement that sought to peacefully negotiate maritime boundaries in the Spratly 
Islands.
214
 China has also diplomatically relinquished territory in the past to resolve 
territorial disputes with countries including, Burma, Russia, and North Korea.
215
  As 
Dingli Shen discusses, China has continued to restrain military action over the disputes in 




Although China’s defense spending is high, it is not as high as it could be with a 
country as large as China. In fact, as Smith argues, much of China’s military buildup is 
concentrated on regional and domestic power projection rather than long-range 
capabilities.
217
 Smith goes on to explain that even though China has new technology and 
weapons systems, it is still a long way from being able to threaten the US mainland with 
them.
218
 Although China has these capabilities, in the numerous incidents that have 
occurred in the South China Sea, it has not used force since 1988. It should also be noted 
that China has increased government spending in all sectors of the economy and 
government, not just in its military budget.  
Although China now has a strong military capability, some argue that China does 
not have the intent to use this force and, therefore, does not present an actual threat. 
China could be building up its military capability purely for defensive purposes with no 
intention to use them in asserting its claims over the South China Sea. If China does not 
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have any intent for use of force then it does not actually present a threat to the US or 
region. Having military strength does not make a country dangerous until they decide to 
employ these capabilities. 
Finally, there is the argument that China’s rise could bring further stability and 
security to the region rather than an increased threat. A regional power in East Asia could 
bring further stability because it would establish norms, and also because the neighboring 
states would have the potential to gain from the regional power.  In China’s case, regional 
countries benefit from Chinese trade and investment, leading to further interdependence 
and, therefore, a more stable region. David Kang agrees with this argument and states 
that East Asia has been more peaceful today than it has since the Opium Wars. He goes 
on to point out that the region has become more stable, established strong multilateral 
institutions, and has increased cooperation through economic, cultural, and political 
relations.
219
 East Asia is highly interdependent, which brings stability as all of the states 
are intertwined and tied to each other. When the region as a whole prospers from one 
country’s rise, others in the region often accommodate it in order to benefit. 
 
History of Chinese-US Relations 
 The Chinese-US relationship has not always been as tense as it appears today. 
Following Chinese market reforms in 1978 the United States was a key partner in 
modernizing China into the international system. In fact, China greatly benefited under 
US world leadership during the 1980s and 90s.
220
 The Chinese economy grew 
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exponentially, with the help of US investment and China membership to the World Trade 
Organization. With these reforms and investments China’s economy is twenty times 
larger today than two decades ago.
221
 Although China and the United States have had 
several past diplomatic incidents including, the accidental bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the mid-air military collision over the South China Sea 
in 2001, relations were relatively good and stable.
222
 This relationship, however, started 
to change as China’s military strength began to increase significantly and the Chinese 
became more brazen in its rhetoric and actions. This change has become apparent in 
China’s deliberate aggressive actions over the territorial waters of the South of China. For 
example, in 2009, a Chinese submarine crashed into a US destroyer’s towed sonar array 
as it closely monitored the ship.
223
 The United States has grown more anxious as China 
has been building aircraft carriers, capturing ship crews in contested waters, and 
threatening neighbors with military actions over this dispute. Over the past several years 
the China-US relationship has intensified and the future is unclear. 
 
Hypothesis 
China’s level of assertion over territory in the South China Sea may not have 
necessarily changed in the past three decades; it still claims ownership to many of the 
same islands and the extent of its exclusive economic zone. China’s aggression in the 
South China Sea has gone through cycles, with periods of low and high levels of intensity. 
China is not currently fighting an armed conflict with anyone over the territory, as 
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occurred in 1974 and 1988. What has changed, however, is China’s level of power, to 
include its military capability. Now China not only has the rhetoric but also the strength 
to back up statements of assertion. The United States has become more actively involved 
because of this increase in capability and power, not because the Chinese are showing 
more assertion.  
With the United States’ recent pivot to Asia, the United States took a very strong 
and public stance on China’s position as a rising power. Although the United States 
helped to develop China three decades ago, China’s power status has reached a critical 
point where the United States feels vulnerable. Both the US reaction to China’s rising 
power and China’s response has caused strained relations between both countries. The 
defensive posturing, military build-up, and rhetoric from both countries lead this chapter 
to argue that a security dilemma between the United States and China has begun. 
Although this security dilemma is in the beginning stages and both sides are working to 
limit its consequences, it has put the United States and China on a dangerous path. This 
strategic distrust between these countries not only makes them less secure, but increases 
threats to peace and security regionally and globally as well. The South China Sea 
dispute may appear to be over a strategic territory, but that is only the surface of the 
conflict. This conflict has now evolved into a Chinese versus US power and influence 
struggle. China is trying to buffer US power, while the United States is attempting to 









 China's level of assertion over the South China Sea has fluctuated over the past 
several decades. In order to grasp how China's level of assertion today is affecting its 
relations with the United States, this chapter will examine two historical case studies of 
periods of high levels of Chinese assertion in the South China Sea and judge US reactions. 
The first will look at the 1974 battle of the Paracel Islands between China and Vietnam. 
The second case study will focus on the 1988 Spratly Island skirmish. This historical 
context will help us understand the United States role before China became the rising 
power it is today. Both of these historical case studies were chosen because they reflect 
periods when China's aggression was at its highest and when the United States was most 
likely to respond. The third case study will look at the present-day dispute and compare 
US responses and China's aggression currently.  
There are several possible responses that the United States could take because of 
Chinese assertion in the South China Sea. The first is that the United States could choose 
not to react, especially if it does not see Chinese aggression as a threat to US interests. 
Because this dispute is not close to or threatening US territory, the United States could 
stay neutral. The United States could also be impartial due to involvement in campaigns 
elsewhere and not choosing to overextend itself. Second, the United States could back its 
allies in the region, such as the Philippines, who are actively involved in the dispute. It 
could provide military training, equipment, and assistance as advisors without directly 
getting involved. In this case, the United States would have a role, but it would not be 
fully engaged. A third option is that the United States could engage in the disputes if US 





military presence in the region, or diplomatic involvement. The following case studies 
will examine instances of US diplomatic or military responses to Chinese aggressive 
behaviors over the South China Sea claims and determine how China’s assertion has 
affected US response.  
Also of note, the South China Sea is only one dispute out of many areas of 
contention between the United States and China. There are other areas of tensions 
between these two powers; however, as Kaplan believes the South China Sea conflict is 




The South China Sea Dispute 
The South China Sea is a strategic body of water located off of the southern coast 
of China. As part of the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea is a maritime boundary to 
eight states including Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam; six of which claim portions of the sea. The South China Sea covers 
approximately 3.7 square kilometers.
225
 These waters include several small island chains 
including the Paracel Islands in the northwest, the Pratas Islands in the northeast, the 
Spratly Islands in the southeast, and the Scarborough Reef in the central region. These 
small islands, not the water, are actually what the conflict is over. Although called islands, 
these landforms are actually reefs, made from volcanic activity, that have very little land 
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mass and are mostly uninhabitable.
226
 This territory is significant not for the land, but for 




The ongoing territorial dispute over these waters goes back to the 19
th
 century. 
Many of these claims are based on various historical records and legal principles, which 
will briefly be explored. Although this tension is longstanding, many believe that this 
dispute could be a potential flashpoint for further conflict in the future. Behind this 
regional territorial dispute is a larger conflict over Chinese rising power and influence. 
Regional neighbors fear Chinese rising power, especially the modernization of its navy, 
and its ability to enforce its claims with use of force. China’s neighbors have begun to 
look to others, including the United States, to balance Chinese rising power and 
aggression. 
 
Economic and Strategic Importance 
There are two main reasons countries want control of these islands in the South 
China Sea. The first is the economic benefit. Control of this area means the exclusive 
right to mine the highly valuable resources, which are essential to economic development. 
According to Chinese National Offshore Oil Company, it is estimated that up to 125 
billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas may be in the South China 
Sea.
228
 The United States Energy Information Administration, however, argues that the 
sea holds approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 
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significantly less than Chinese estimates.
229
 These numbers are vastly different, but, in 
part are due to the lack of mineral exploration that has been done in the sea. Regardless, 
there is wealth and security in these resources. Now that China is the second largest 
consumer of oil, it could benefit from having the security of its own offshore supply.
230
 
The South China Sea is also an important and plentiful fishery. About ten percent of the 
global fish catch comes from the South China Sea.
231
  
Besides the economic resources, the South China Sea is an important sea lane. It 
lies between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, at a crossroads between the east and the west. 
Just in 2012, over 5.3 trillion US dollars’ worth of trade traveled through the waters of 
the South China Sea.
232
  This equals over half of global trade, more than the Panama or 
Suez Canals.
233
 This body of water is an important link between Asia and the United 
States, vital for free trade and strategic supplies. About two-thirds of South Korea’s 
energy supplies, 60 percent of Japan’s, and 80 percent of China’s crude-oil imports all 
come by way of the South China Sea.
234
 Cutting off these supplies would have a severe 
effect on these countries’ economies, not to mention affecting the ability to mobilize 
armies for defense. 
In addition to the economic advantage, controlling these waters also brings a 
strategic advantage. These sea lanes are an essential route between the United States and 
                                                          
229
 US Energy Information Administration, “South China Sea Overview.” 
230
 US Energy Information Administration, “China: Country Analysis Brief Overview,” 30 May 2013, at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ch. 
231




 Glaser, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea.”  
233
 Kaplan, “The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict: The 21
st
 Century’s Defining Battleground is 







its allies in Southeast Asia. If war should break out, control of these vital waterways 
could mean the difference between victory and defeat.  
 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
There are six countries with maritime boundaries on the South China Sea that 
hold claim to portions of the sea, partially based upon The United Nation’s Convention 
on the Law of the Seas. This convention, which was negotiated between 1973 and 1982, 
states that a country has rights over the exploration and use of resources up to 200 
nautical miles from its coast.
235
 Under this convention, any island territory also applies. 
This 200 nautical mile area is called an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Inside an EEZ, 
states have exclusive rights to extract resources from under the waters. This is why many 
states lay claim to portions of the island chains in the South China Sea: to extend their 
exclusive economic zones and have access to the wealth of oil, natural gas, and fish.  
 
History of the South China Sea  
Many of these territorial claims are a complex combination of history and legal 
issues, often difficult to decipher. China lays claim to approximately 80 percent of the 
South China Sea.
236
 Its claim is often referred to as the nine-dashed line, due to the nine 
dashed markations China set as its claim back in 1949.
237
 This claim extends over 1,200 
miles, almost to Malaysia.
238
 China argues a historic claim to the Spratly and Paracel 
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Islands, land that would therefore extend its EEZ and mining rights. Many of the 
claimants in this dispute trace early claims back to ancient times when explorers, military 
patrols, and fisherman did surveys and left geographical markers on these reefs.
239
 
However, according to Buszynski, many of these historic claims do not carry much 
weight in international law today.
240
 The dispute over the islands did not begin until the 
early 1900s when many of these states sought economic benefits and had the strength to 
ensure sovereignty over territory.
241
 Following decolonization after World War II many 
of the surrounding countries scrambled to occupy these islands, inlets, and reefs for 
access to the territory and for many of the strategic reasons already cited.
242
 These early 
claims formed the basis of the conflict that still exists today. 
  
1974 Paracel Island Battle 
 In January 1974, territorial disputes between the Republic of Vietnam and China 
over portions of the Paracel Islands culminated in a small-scale naval skirmish. This was 
the first military clash over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Not only did 
this battle change the control of the islands, but it also showed that China was willing to 
go so far as to risk war over these territorial claims.  
Prior to the battle, both South Vietnam and China held portions of Paracel Islands 
and claims to the entire island chain. In the 1970s, resources such as oil and natural gas 
were increasingly sought after due to an upsurge in energy costs. This caused China and 
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South Vietnam to be more assertive over their claims. On January 15, 1974, a South 
Vietnamese navy frigate was sent to survey the islands that South Vietnam held claim to. 
It found Chinese fisherman on three of its islands setting up huts, digging tombs, and 
boldly flying the Chinese flag.
243
 South Vietnam responded, by sending a navy flotilla to 











 These led to a much larger battle that took place on 
January 19, 1974. The South Vietnamese forces approached the Chinese position and 
landed forty troops on two of the islands.
246
 The Vietnamese forces faced strong 
resistance, and gun fire, and quickly retreated back to their ships where they were 
outnumbered by advancing Chinese submarines and warships.
247
 A naval battle ensued 
and the South Vietnamese took heavy casualties. When the smoke cleared, fifty-three 
South Vietnamese soldiers had been killed and over forty had been taken prisoners of 
war.
248




The battle resulted in China’s complete control of the Paracel Islands chain, 
which it still maintains today.
250
 Another outcome from the skirmish resulted in greater 
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competition elsewhere over the South China Sea.
251
  Now that South Vietnam had been 
defeated in the Paracel Islands, it began looking for other islands to claim and turned its 
attention to the Spratly Island chain. This increased competition over the Spratly Island 
chain lead to another skirmish, which will be explored in the subsequent case study. 
 The United States, who just the year before had pulled out of Vietnam, was still a 
close ally of South Vietnam. According to historical accounts, the South Vietnamese 
looked to the United States for help during the skirmish in January of 1974.
252
 The US 
Seventh Fleet, which included an aircraft carrier, was stationed at Subic Bay in the 
Philippines and could have easily assisted the South Vietnamese in the conflict and 
searched for missing troops.
253
 The Seventh Fleet, however, was under strict orders not to 
assist and to stay completely out of the conflict and vicinity of the Paracel Islands.
254
 The 
United States did not take sides and chose to remain neutral throughout the entire 
skirmish. According to historical records, the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
informed the Chinese Ambassador, “The United States has taken no position in 
supporting the South Vietnamese claims to these islands.”
255
  
 The United States reluctantly did intervene when it was discovered that a 
Department of Defense employee, Gerald Emil Kosh, had been aboard one of the 
Vietnamese ships involved in the conflict. According to news reports, he was doing 
liaison work with the South Vietnamese Navy and was aboard one of the patrol boats. 
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The patrol left Kosh on Pattle Island for his own safety during the skirmish, but he was 
later captured by Chinese forces.
256
 Kosh was brought back to China and held with 48 
other Vietnamese prisoners of the war, also captured in the battle.
257
 After becoming 
aware of the capture of an American, the US intervened diplomatically. In the same 
meeting, Henry Kissinger stated to the Chinese Ambassador, 
The South Vietnamese government is making a number of representations to 
international organizations, to SEATO as well as to the United Nations. We 
wanted to let you know we do not associate ourselves with those representations. 
We are concerned, however, about the prisoners, and we noted that your 





Although the United States needed to intervene for the safety of its employee, it was 
made very clear to the Chinese that the US would not get involved in the conflict or even 
the complaints before the international organizations. The United States government 
quietly worked to get its DOD member released, but took no other diplomatic action 
concerning this conflict. 
 In 1974, the United States had just emerged from an unpopular, large-scale war 
abroad and politically did not want to get dragged into another conflict. The United States, 
two years earlier, had also begun negotiations with the Chinese to open up its economy 
and to normalize relations between the two countries.
259
 There are several reasons why 
the US did not intervene, the most important being that none of its interests at the time 
were in jeopardy. Although China did threaten US allies, China had not yet become the 
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regional power. The United States did not yet feel threatened enough to engage China, in 
part because many of the conditions listed in the literature review were not yet present. 
 
1988 Spratly Island Battle 
 In the spring of 1988, a similar naval battle broke out between Vietnam and China 
over another set of islands, the Johnson South Reef, part of the Spratly island chain. Prior 
to this skirmish, the Chinese had only claimed, not occupied, any of the Spratly 
Islands.
260
 As China continued to establish its claim to the Spratly Islands, it began naval 
deployments to the area and constructed observation posts.
261
 The reef that the Chinese 
chose for this post was near Vietnamese-controlled islands. Vietnam began to monitor 
Chinese movements in this portion of the sea, leading to several naval confrontations and 
eventually a naval battle.  
 On March 13, 1988, three Vietnamese ships approached the Chinese position on 
the Johnson South Reef where Vietnamese forces attempted to land and raise a 
Vietnamese flag in what was a Vietnamese-claimed area.
262
 Shots were exchanged and a 
firefight between PLA and Vietnamese forces ensued. As a result of the two-day battle, 
74 Vietnamese soldiers were killed and all three Vietnamese boats were sunk.
263
 Yet 
again the Chinese came away unscathed; however, there was no clear outcome in this 
battle as there had been in the 1974 skirmish. Both China and Vietnam remained partial 
claimants to portions of the island chain, unlike the skirmish in 1974.
264
 In fact, both 
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China and Vietnam expanded their claims to the islands and increased their military 
posture over the disputed territory in the aftermath.
265
 This increase in tensions over the 
Spratly Islands made the other claimants, including Malaysia and the Philippines, also 
race to claim territory, further escalating the dispute.
266
 
 Following this even more deadly naval skirmish and escalation, the United States 
continued to remain neutral. One defense official at the time stated that the United States 
would not become involved unless the conflict interfered “with freedom of the seas, then 
we would be prepared to escort and make sure that free navigation continues.”
267
  The 
United States continued to make it clear that it would not become involved in a regional 
dispute. This position was reaffirmed in the United States’ Security Strategy for the East-
Asia Pacific Region, “The United States’ interests in Asia have been remarkably 
consistent over the past two centuries: peace and security; commercial access to the 
region; freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or 
coalition.”
268
 The United States’ main goal during this period was stability in the region 
and becoming involved in this conflict could result in a larger-scale war. At this period 
the United States was still focused on the Soviet Union and ending the Cold War. None 
of its major allies were involved and the conflict did not reach the point of impeding 
freedom of navigation. China also was not yet a rising power, so the US did not need to 
prevent any aggression posed by a potential hegemon. 
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 Although the United States encouraged a diplomatic end to the conflict, it took 
no steps to engage both sides in talks. In fact, by this time the United States had 
substantially reduced its naval presence in the region due to the lack of a threat.
269
 Even 
though the 1988 skirmish was more deadly than the one in 1974, the United States was 
even less involved because one of its employees had not been captured. China, also had 
not completely occupied the Spratly Islands as it had the Paracel Islands in the aftermath 
of the1974 skirmish. Koo believes that if China had, it would have been met with more 
resistance than in 1974.
270
 Another reason for the lack of involvement was China-US 
relations were in good standing and both sides did not want to risk division over a 
territorial dispute. At this point, the United States still did not feel its interests were 
threatened by Chinese aggression and thus remained neutral.  
 
2010-Today: The Continuing South China Sea Dispute 
Since 2010, tensions between the claimants, especially China, Vietnam and the 
Philippines, have escalated as the deadline for states to make seabed hydrocarbon claims 
to the United Nations passed in 2009.
271
 Since the 1988 skirmish, East Asia has been 
transformed. China is now a rising power, building its political, economic, and military 
capabilities. China’s neighbors have also grown more anxious about China’s increased 
power, especially its military capabilities, combined with its assertions over the South 
China Sea. 
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A combination of many small confrontations rather than a single incident has 
caused this increase in tensions. China has been described as the aggressor in many of 
these recent instances and blamed for the increase in tensions. For example, in 2011, 
Chinese maritime patrol vessels came upon a Vietnamese oil survey ship within 
Vietnam’s EEZ and cut the lines.
272
 Vietnam responded by lodging a formal complaint 
with China’s ambassador, claiming a violation of international law and Vietnamese 
sovereignty.
273
 The Chinese reacted by claiming it abided by “completely normal marine 
enforcement and surveillance activities in China’s jurisdictional area.”
274
 Not only has 
China gone after oil exploration vessels but it has also targeted Vietnamese fishermen. In 




Vietnam has not been the only recipient of recent Chinese increased aggression 
and harassment. The Chinese have also increased its hostility towards the Philippines. 
Both Filipino oil exploration vessels and fishermen have been harassed and held by the 
Chinese. In the most recent case, a Chinese law enforcement ship attempted to drive off 
Filipino fisherman from Scarborough Shoal by firing a water cannon at them.
276
 The 
incident has stirred protests in the Philippines and a Filipino official stated that they 
hoped for a peaceful resolution, but that they would not hesitate to respond to 
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 As a result of this increased aggression, the Philippines lodged a 
formal complaint to the United Nations over China’s claims because Manila had 
exhausted "almost all political and diplomatic avenues.”
278
 The case is still pending and 
China refuses to participate.
279
 It is highly unlikely that the UN will be able to make 
China adhere to an international ruling over this issue. Both of these examples show that 
although a battle has not broken out since 1988, tensions remain high and these territorial 
disputes remain a flashpoint in the region that could erupt at any moment. 
 Not only have China’s neighbors encountered increased Chinese aggression in the 
South China Sea, but so has the United States. The United States has historically 
patrolled in, flown over, and conducted military exercises throughout the South China 
Sea. China does not approve of these activities in the South China Sea and has tried to 
prevent the United States from entering what is technically international waters and air. 
China has had a habit of closely tailing US reconnaissance flights over the South China 
Sea. In 2001, a US and Chinese jet actually collided, causing a large diplomatic crisis. 
The United States blamed Chinese aggression, while China argued protection over its 
airspace.
280
 Even more recently, in December 2013, a United State cruiser was forced to 
take evasive measures to avoid colliding with a Chinese ship in the South China Sea.  
According to press reports, the US vessel was observing the Chinese aircraft carrier in 
international waters, when the small Chinese ship cut across in front of the US ship, 
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almost causing a collision.
281
 This was an aggressive move on China’s part and would 
have given the United States more than enough reason to retaliate. Although only words 
were exchanged in this instance, this situation exemplifies how tense relations are and 
that these tensions could explode over one small incident.   
 On top of this upsurge of Chinese assertion, in 2012, Hu Jintao proclaimed that 
China would develop “‘into a maritime power,’ which would be ‘resolute’ in its 
safeguarding of China’s maritime rights and interests.”
282
 China has been crafting itself 
into this naval power by building up its capability and technology.  In 2011, China 
finished refitting an old Soviet aircraft carrier and joined the small group of states with 
this sea power.
283
 China has also militarized the South China Sea by adding a major naval 
base on Hainan Island, located only 180 nautical miles from the Paracel Islands. This 
base will be able to serve as a strategic point for both aircraft carriers and submarines.
284
 
The construction of this base on the South China Sea adds a further element of perceived 
aggression to the conflict. Along with the sea-based power, China has built up mobile 
ballistic missile systems that can easily reach many of these disputed areas from the 
Chinese mainland.
285
 As explored in the literature review, China’s increase in military 
capabilities causes other states to worry about Chinese intentions and can cause them to 
view China as a legitimate threat. Combine China’s military advancements, with its 
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increase in aggression and China’s history of invasion, and the outcome is that China is 
an emerging threat.  
Back in 1974 and 1988 China was a strong force that inflicted a large amount of 
damage on the Vietnamese. Today, with China’s advanced technology and stronger 
capabilities, China has the ability to cause even more damage. Many of the small 
countries that also lay claim to these islands have little chance against a power of China’s 
size and strength. Due to China’s status as a regional power, it has a responsibility to set 
the tone for the region and find a balance between cooperation and competition.
286
 Until 
China is ready to come to the table and negotiate, the South China Sea dispute will 
continue. China is a key player in ending this conflict. 
 
Reaction by the United States 
No further naval battles have taken place in the South China Sea since 1988; 
however, the conflict today is receiving renewed interest, especially from the United 
States. Since 2010, the United States government and media have been increasingly 
reporting on and discussing this conflict. The events in 1974 and 1988 were barely 
reported, so what has changed today?
287
 The South China Sea conflict has not intensified; 
in fact, some might argue that the dispute has quieted with the lack of physical military 
skirmishes.
288
 Aggression by China over this territory has also not drastically increased 
since the 1970s or 80s. It can be argued that China has even lessened its assertion because 
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an armed conflict has not broken out since 1988. So why, now is the United States more 
interested in the South China Sea Conflict?  
 As seen in the two previous case studies, the United States’ policy towards the 
South China Sea conflict was to remain neutral and intervene only if freedom of 
navigation was in jeopardy. Today, this has changed and the United States is taking a 
more active role in the conflict. At the core of the United States’ China policy is the 
recent ‘Pivot to Asia.’ Announced by the Obama Administration in November 2010, this 
rebalance is aimed at refocusing United States’ government resources on the Asia-Pacific 
region. Secretary of State at the time, Hilary Clinton, also published an article in Foreign 
Policy calling for:  
Six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our 
working relationships with emerging powers, including China; engaging with 
regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a 
broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.
289
   
 
The Obama Administration denies that this rebalancing is entirely due to China’s rise; 
however, several academics argue that it is the only reason to focus so many resources on 
a region that was overlooked two decades ago. In Clinton’s six key lines of action, China 
is the only country named with a focus on issues in and with China. 
As part of the Pivot to Asia, the United States has begun to refocus defense and 
political resources on the Asia-Pacific region. In October 2011, the United States and 
Australia signed an agreement to establish a US base that would house approximately 
2,500 Marines in Darwin, off the northern coast of Australia.
290
 The Chinese reacted by 
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arguing that the United States is escalating military tensions and encircling China.
291
 The 
United States has also sought closer relations with countries in Southeast Asia. For 
example, the United States has strengthened its alliance with the Philippines through 
military exercises, providing military equipment, and establishing a staging point for US 
troops and equipment.
292
 As chapter two discussed, these relations may be in part due to 
China’s neighbors wishing to balance this rising power. A Chinese foreign ministry 
spokesman responded with, “It may not be quite appropriate to intensify and expand 
military alliances and may not be in the interest of countries within this region.”
293
    
The United States has also been increasing its diplomatic rhetoric over the 
territorial dispute. Official language by US policymakers has intensified compared to the 
language used during the 1974 and 1988 skirmishes. In 2010, at an international meeting 
in Hanoi, than Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made a speech that outlined the United 
States’ new policy in the South China Sea.
294
 These principles included “respect for 
freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of commerce, negotiation 
of a Code of Conduct for dispute resolution and, most relevant here, the view that claims 
to water could only be based on legitimate land-based claims.”
295
 This was the first time 
that the United States outright rejected China’s claims. More recently, in early 2014, the 
Obama Administration stepped up its rhetoric and challenged China’s nine-dashed line 
claim in the South China Sea. Several high level officials inside the administration have 
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called on China to, “adjust [its claim] to bring it into accordance with international law of 
the sea.”
296
 They have also threatened that if China establishes a South China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone, as it did in the East China Sea, the United States would 
change its military posture in the region.
297
 Previous US policy was to stay neutral in this 
territorial dispute; however, it is now clear that the United States has definitely altered its 
position on this territorial dispute. 
The United States claimed early on that it would become involved in the South 
China Sea conflict only if its interests, particularly freedom of navigation, were infringed 
upon. US interests in the region have clearly changed. As made apparent through the 
historical case studies, the United States is more concerned about the possibility of 
conflict in the South China Sea today than in previous years. Why is this? Combine 
China’s rising power, with its increasing naval capabilities, its expansive claims, and its 
history of evoking violence over this territory and China appears quite threatening.
298
 The 
United States is working to curb Chinese aggression, influence, and power in the region. 
As the current hegemon, the United States has a lot at stake from China’s rise. 
 
Security Dilemma 
With continued military buildup and increased aggression by China and the 
United States’ pivot to Asia, a security dilemma is ongoing between these two states. As 
noted in the literature review, in order for a security dilemma to exist, both states must 
strategically distrust one another. This can be seen between China and the United States 
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over the South China Sea conflict. The standard example of a security dilemma is World 
War I. Although China and the United States do not have a physical border, a security 
dilemma still applies. The United States has a worldwide navy and has built up a 
presence in the Asia-Pacific area. China is working to match US naval power. Offensive 
and defensive capabilities can still be increased on both sides. Both China and the United 
States have shown aggressive tendencies, which have caused further military buildup and 
diplomatic problems. Although both governments have not acknowledged this occurrence, 
the evidence is in China’s rhetoric, continued military expansion, and aggressive 
maneuvers, and the United States’ pivot to Asia.  
When comparing the current situation over the South China Sea to Jervis’ 
defensive-offensive chart from the literature review, the security dilemma fits in the 
category where offensive and defensive measures are distinguishable, but offensive has 
the favor.
299
 Jervis notes that in this type of security dilemma future conflict is possible, 
but not immediate. Case in point, there is not an immediate threat of conflict between the 
United States and China over the South China Sea. A more likely scenario would be 
China becoming involved in a skirmish with a US ally, such as the Philippines, drawing 
the United States into the conflict.   
 The dispute over the South China Sea is intrinsically important to both the United 
States and China as evident in both parties’ recent policies and actions. China has already 
risked many of its relationships with neighbors over this territorial dispute. As explored 
in the second chapter many of the regional states are anxious over China’s increased 
power and aggression as shown in the South China Sea. These neighbors are worried 
because China now has the strength to support its rhetoric and claims. China has risked 
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these relationships through its highly aggressive behavior all in pursuit of this territory 
and the resources beneath. For China the South China Sea also holds a nationalist 
sentiment, which it does not want to let go of. The United States has also made it clear 
that Asia, including the South China Sea dispute, is a major focus for the United States 
government. The US policy of rebalancing to Asia has shifted a lot of US foreign policy 
goals to this region and the United States is ready to take a more active role. The United 
States has repeatedly told allies in the region that the US would come to their aid in the 
event of a conflict, thereby showing US commitment to allies in the region. Although it is 
unclear exactly how involved the United States would become if conflict broke out in the 
South China Sea, the US does have many interests in the region that would be at stake. 
The United States continues to affirm this position with continued military assists in the 
region and high level government visits to the region, most recently President Obama, in 
April 2014.   
  
Conclusions 
 China’s level of increased assertion and aggression over the territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea is not a new trend. China displayed these high levels in both 1974 
and 1988 when it used military force in order to support its claims. Two things have 
changed, however: China’s rising power status and the response by the United States. 
The change in response by the United States is directly linked to Chinese rising power 
and advancing military capabilities. During the 1974 and 1988 incidents the United States 
did not respond because China did not represent what the United States considered to be 





countries, over some strategic islands, with very little relevance to the United States. Now 
that China is a larger power in the region and could come to threaten US power, the US 
considers China’s level of assertion over the territorial rights in the South China Sea a 
realistic threat. 
The future of relations between the United States and China is fragile. The 
ongoing security dilemma is dangerous and could result in conflict if either side gets too 
carried away. In order to mitigate the threat of the security dilemma, both countries need 
to engage in continued cooperation through military exchanges and diplomatic channels. 
They have the difficult task of turning a relationship of distrust into one of reassurance. 
This type of mutual cooperation will set both countries on the path to a stronger 





























China is a rising power, not just regionally, but globally. This rise in power has 
affected governmental affairs on all three levels: domestic, regional, and international. 
Although China’s rise to power has largely been peaceful up to this point, this could 
likely change in the future as regional and global partners continue to react to China’s 
rise.  Changes to the regional or even global power structures can have adverse effects on 
the international environment, causing states to choose sides and take up alignment 
strategies. Countries are currently unsure of what to expect from China’s increasing 
power. China has shown two different sides of its rising power, one of soft power and a 
second of aggression and force. Will China be a rising power who employs soft power or 
use force to secure its interests? Although China is quickly building and strengthening its 
military, political, and economic capabilities there are other internal and external factors 
that China must consider and address in its rise to power.  
On the domestic level, the Chinese government must work to alleviate the severe 
human security issues within China. As concluded earlier, these issues could ultimately 
stagnate China’s rise to power because this rise is built upon an unstable domestic base 
that could easily collapse. As China continues to become more globalized, combined with 
the increase in economic development, the population will come to expect more from the 
government, including rights, liberties, and protection. If Chinese citizens do not receive 
basic needs and services this could be catalyst for unrest and possible uprising in China. 
China has a large population that if organized could ultimately overthrow the regime. As 
observed through the case studies, Chinese citizens have already begun to increase their 





Economic, environmental, and personal human security issues are all intertwined, 
leading this thesis to argue that there is more than one human security issue within China 
that has the potential to cause unrest. All of these human security issues negatively 
impact the Chinese population in one way or another and because many of these issues 
are intertwined a problem in one area could affect another. For example, if a person falls 
ill due to the poor air quality, this in turn could come to have economic impacts as they 
could no longer work. The Chinese government has been focused on keeping economic 
levels high and unemployment low; however, they also need to focus on other human 
security factors including environmental and personal security. These problems could 
equally cause unrest within China. The Chinese government has slowly begun to address 
some of these human security issues including inequality and pollution levels. However, 
the rate at which the Chinese government is dealing with these problems has not kept up 
with the growth rate of these issues and the problems continue to multiply. China must 
address all of these human security issues in order to better secure its future, meet its 
economic goals, and gain military strength. 
On the regional level, China must continue to engage with its neighbors through 
soft power interactions. China’s neighbors have begun to diversify relations so as not to 
be so reliant on a rising power whose true intensions are unclear. China must not only 
continue to assure its regional neighbors of its soft power approach, but also demonstrate 
that approach to them. China needs to become involved in more soft power projects that 
do not just benefit China’s national agenda. Many of China’s soft power projects 
explored in chapter two have an internal benefit to China. For example, the dam that 





was primarily for China’s gain. The Chinese spun the project as economic development 
for Burma in order to win its approval. This, however, caused the local people to distrust 
Chinese intensions and the project was ultimately cancelled. Recently, China began to 
use a hospital boat to visit countries and provide medical assistance.  This is the type of 
soft power influence China needs to utilize in order to win over the hearts and minds of 
many neighboring countries. As China comes to bear the responsibility of a regional 
power it needs to demonstrate it has regional interests in mind. 
China also needs to reassess its aggressive positions in regional conflicts, like the 
South China Sea dispute. China’s hostile behavior towards many of its regional neighbors 
over these disputes could enhance distrust and lead to countries diversifying their 
relations, as was observed with Burma, Vietnam, and the Philippines. These countries do 
not want to be reliant on a rising power that cannot be trusted or depended upon. Historic 
relations with China suggest that China has a past of invasion and violence against its 
neighbors. Many of these countries recall that history and China’s capabilities. Now that 
China has even more military strength, regional countries have become more concerned. 
The threats and aggressive posturing that China has demonstrated over territorial disputes 
has only added to the regional anxieties. As a result of Chinese increased military power 
and aggressions, Burma and Vietnam have begun to be move towards a different 
alignment strategy regarding China.  
China’s rise to power has had global affects as well. This impact is clearly visible 
in the ongoing South China Sea dispute. Prior to China’s rise to power the United States 
showed little interest in this regional territorial dispute. It has only been since China’s rise 





aggression.  This has led to the South China Sea conflict potentially becoming a flash 
point for violence between the two countries. China’s assertion in the South China Sea 
conflict has not necessarily increased, in fact, it has decreased because China has not 
engaged in a naval battle over the dispute since 1988. What, however, has increased is 
China’s power and military capabilities. This has allowed China to be more brazen in 
pursuing its territorial claims. It now has the ability to support its rhetoric and many of 
the smaller neighboring states have little chance of defense against a larger power. This is 
why China’s rise to power has made the United States more anxious over China’s 
intentions in the South China Sea. Prior to this the US showed little concern because 
China has less capability and did not pose the same threat it does today. 
With continued military buildup and increased aggression by China and the 
United States’ pivot to Asia, a security dilemma is ongoing between these two states. In 
order for a security dilemma to exist, both states must strategically distrust one another. 
This can be seen between China and the United States over the South China Sea conflict. 
China has strengthened its military power and increased rhetoric and aggression over its 
territorial claims, while the United States has rebalanced military capabilities to focus on 
East Asia. This current path is extremely dangerous and has the potential to put global 
affairs at risk. Not only are the relations between both countries affected, but this could 
cause other states to feel the need to choose a side. 
In order to prevent a future conflict between the United States and China over the 
South China Sea dispute, both countries need an enhanced dialog. They need to be 
forthright with any action they are taking in the region, so as not to alarm the other.  They 





distrust that currently exists between both countries. Taking these cooperative steps will 
lessen tensions in the region and make for a more stable environment.  
As China continues into the 21
st
 century as a rising power, the Chinese 
government will continue to focus on several key goals in order to maintain China’s new 
status and stability on the home front.  The Communist Party’s main focus will be on 
preserving stability domestically as its economy, environment, and social structure 
continue to change. The Chinese citizens are ultimately the state’s largest threat and 
China will remain focused on suppressing any potential uprising or social movements. 
China must remain stable in order to continue its rise to power and its domestic stability 
will take precedent over many other goals sought by the regime.  
China will also continue to focus on projecting its new rising power status around 
the world. This rising power will continue to seek raw materials and access to foreign 
markets across the globe to fuel its economic growth. The South China Sea dispute also is 
and will continue to be a main goal of the regime. For China this dispute is much more 
then access to territory and resources, it is also about Chinese power projection in the 
region. 
The world has begun to change due to the arrival of a new power. China’s rise to 
power is extremely influential in many aspects of foreign affairs today. This thesis 
pointed out several factors that need to be considered when attempting to understand the 
impact that China’s rise could ultimately have. China’s rise to power still faces obstacles, 
especially domestically, which could undermine much of the economic, political, and 
military power China has established. Unfortunately, as examined through the last three 





connotation.  This is largely a result of China’s aggressive behavior directed at its 
neighbors. China must recognize what its role as a rising power is in the larger global 
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